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Federal Rule of Evidence 502 promised to change American litigation 
for the better.  It was heralded as a solution to the gross inequity and spiral-
ing litigation costs associated with the painstaking, cumbersome, and largely 
wasteful document reviews necessary to protect the attorney-client privilege.  
And in some measure, it succeeded.  It has brought uniformity, predictability, 
and equity to issues of inadvertent disclosure and subject matter waiver.  But 
a largely overlooked provision of the rule promises even bigger, and more 
troubling changes.  Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) authorizes district 
courts to enter discovery orders protecting parties from the waiver conse-
quences normally attached to sharing privileged materials.  This new power, 
however, was not meaningfully circumscribed by Congress.  Instead, Rule 
502(d)'s plain language appears to authorize everything from court-
sanctioned “clawback” and “quick peek” agreements to wholesale voluntary 
disclosures.  What is more, once a district court authorizes a disclosure, sub-
sequent parties and even state courts are bound by the district court's deci-
sion.  This Article examines the development and early application of Rule 
502(d) as well as its underlying rationale in an effort to address some of the 
potential benefits and consequences attendant to such a far-reaching – even 
paradigm changing – evidentiary rule.  It finds that, while the new rule could 
promote more efficient litigation, Rule 502(d) orders may ultimately bring 
about little in the way of cost savings, erode the attorney-client privilege, and 
further complicate modern discovery practice. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
An end to spiraling discovery costs.1  No more inadvertent waiver.2  The 
final days of the much-dreaded subject matter waiver.3  Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 502 has been heralded as the legislative innovation that could bring an 
  
 * Associate, Alston & Bird LLP; J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., Southern 
Methodist University. 
 1. 154 CONG. REC. H7817-18 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of Rep. Jack-
son-Lee); 153 CONG. REC. S15141-43 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2007) (statements of Sen. 
Leahy and Sen. Specter). 
 2. 154 CONG. REC. H7817-18 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of Rep. Jack-
son-Lee). 
 3. Id. at H7819 (statement of Rep. King). 
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end to all of these common and costly afflictions plaguing American litiga-
tion.  After two decades of largely unsuccessful tinkering with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure,4 Congress believed that it had struck upon a novel 
and effective solution – shift the focus from how information is shared in 
discovery to how it is actually used as evidence in litigation.5  But what if this 
shift portends even more significant structural changes to the fundamental 
operation of federal trial courts?  The plain language of Rule 502(d) appears 
to authorize courts to protect even voluntary disclosures of attorney-client 
privileged information where such an authorization best serves the immediate 
needs of a pending matter.6  Are the possible consequences of this new judi-
cial authority – affecting everything from the types of information shared in 
discovery to the forms of evidence that can be admitted at trial to the trou-
bling consequences of shielding trial proceedings from public view – worth 
the purported cost-savings that brought about this shift in the first place? 
These claims may, at first blush, seem alarmist.  After all, Rule 502(d) – 
a very brief, forty-six-word “enabling” provision7 – sits at the end of a fairly 
narrow rule clearly targeted at issues regarding inadvertent disclosures and 
productions in government investigations.8  Further, Rule 502(d) limits itself 
to the attorney-client privilege and work product protection.9  But in the short 
time since Rule 502 went into effect, it has already overleaped these limita-
tions.  Federal courts around the country immediately embraced the new rule 
with open arms in the two years following its effective date, and many of 
these courts have already begun casting a hopeful eye toward expanding the 
rule’s reach to resolve a host of common problems with both large- and 
small-scale litigation.10  In the most striking examples, courts have used Rule 
  
 4. The numerous, and arguably only marginally successful, revisions to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designed to address the increasing costs and burdens 
of discovery in an electronic world have been well-documented and fall beyond the 
scope of this Article.  For more on these rules, see Henry S. Noyes, Is E-Discovery So 
Different that It Requires New Discovery Rules? An Analysis of Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71 TENN. L. REV. 585, 617-54 (2004) 
(examining and criticizing several more recent efforts to effect reform through the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 5. FED. R. EVID. 502 addendum to advisory committee notes. 
 6. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d). 
 7. See id. (“Controlling Effect of a Court Order.  A Federal court may order that 
the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation 
pending before the court – in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any 
other federal or state proceeding.”). 
 8. See generally FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 9. Id. (limiting all of the provision of the rule to “information covered by the 
attorney-client privilege or work-product protection”). 
 10. See, e.g., Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., 
No. 4:08-CV-684-Y, 2009 WL 464989, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009) (holding that 
the plain language of Rule 502(d) does not limit district courts to using their new-
found authority to redress inadvertent waivers).  
2
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502(d) to justify compelled disclosures of privileged documents11 and even to 
authorize purely voluntary disclosures between adverse parties.12  These early 
cases mark a truly radical shift away from more than a century of privilege 
jurisprudence.  If left unchecked, this shift will carry a wide array of collat-
eral consequences.  And while these consequences could be both beneficial 
and detrimental, one thing is clear: they were largely overlooked throughout 
the rule-making process.   
This Article explores the potential applications and extensions of Rule 
502(d) already starting to emerge in the case law.  Part II examines the as-
pects of the attorney-client privilege that created the problems Rule 502 was 
intended to resolve.  Specifically, it addresses the relatively brief history of 
the requirement that a party forever preserve the confidentiality of privileged 
communications to avoid a waiver.  Part III takes a detailed look at the rule-
making process that resulted in the promulgation of Rule 502 to determine 
what potential issues were considered by Congress and identify some of the 
unexpected issues that have arisen in the early application of the rule.  Part IV 
evaluates the early applications of Rule 502(d) since its inception, as well as 
some of the early noteworthy developments related to other parts of the rule.  
This analysis focuses on the various judicial innovations and expansions that 
have already pushed this fledgling judicial power in bold new directions.  Part 
V assesses a number of consequences of adopting a broad view of Rule 
502(d), ranging from the potential due process implications of binding absent 
parties with a federal court order to the potential discovery cost reductions to 
the ever-increasing assault on the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege. 
II.  THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
The attorney-client privilege is an extraordinary device.  In an effort to 
promote candor and the better pursuit of truth through the adversarial process, 
it excludes and suppresses relevant, factual information.13  Though not im-
  
 11. See PIC Grp., Inc. v. LandCoast Insulation, Inc., No. 1:09–CV–662–KS–
MTP, 2011 WL 2669144, at *4 (S.D. Miss. July 7, 2011); Radian Asset Assurance, 
Inc. v. Coll. of the Christian Bros., No. CIV 09-0885 JB/DJS, 2010 WL 4928866, at 
*2 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010); Wade v. Gaither, No. 2:08-cv-641-WFD-DN, 2010 WL 
624249, at *3 (D. Utah Feb. 20, 2010); Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, LLP, 2009 
WL 464989, at *5; Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 219 (Fed. Cl. 
2010). 
 12. See, e.g., D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., No. 06-687 (JDB/JMF), 2010 
WL 3324964, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2010) (authorizing a voluntary arrangement 
whereby “[d]efendants agreed to permit plaintiff to test the validity of the privilege 
log using statistical sampling” that involved the voluntary disclosure of randomly 
selected privileged documents without working a waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege as to those documents). 
 13. 1 PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 2:3 
(2d ed. 1999). 
3
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penetrable, it represents a sturdy and reliable shield against prying eyes such 
that clients in the American judicial system feel comfortable sharing informa-
tion with their counsel.  And the requirements to invoke this invaluable pro-
tection are fairly straightforward: the attorney-client privilege protects (1) 
communications between a client and her attorney (2) made in the pursuit of 
legal advice or assistance (3) that are intended to be confidential (4) so long 
as that confidentiality is preserved.14  It is this last aspect of the privilege – 
the requirement that confidentiality be preserved – that bears most of the 
blame for the laborious and expensive process of privilege review that, as 
discussed infra in Part III, motivated Congress to reform the law of attorney-
client privilege.15  Though held sacred today by most courts, this requirement 
that privileged information remain confidential against all outsiders is a fairly 
modern invention16 that, in many respects, has caused far more harm than 
good during its relatively brief existence.   
This Part considers the history, the current condition, and the merits of 
this key element of privilege analysis.  First, it examines the twentieth-
century origins of this addition to the much older elements of the attorney-
client privilege along with the surrounding circumstances that purportedly 
motivated its development.  Second, it explores the current state of the confi-
dentiality requirement while addressing the growing chorus of scholarly, ju-
dicial, and practical voices calling for an end to the perpetual preservation 
requirement.   
A.  The Origins of the Not-So-Old Confidentiality Requirement 
Like so many common law doctrines, the attorney-client privilege bears 
the ratification of age.  Thus, the more than 400 year history of the privilege 
often entices the unwary into simply assuming that every aspect of the privi-
lege has enjoyed the full vetting of centuries of common law tradition.  But, 
in reality, the privilege also shares another feature of a great many common 
law doctrines: what it is today is not what it always was.17  Specifically, the 
preservation of confidentiality was not a requirement of the early common 
law privilege.18  In fact, the requirement of initial confidentiality is only a 
  
 14. See id. § 2.1; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton ed. 1961); see 
also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 
1950) (propounding the modern definition in the first instance); PROPOSED FED. R. 
EVID. 503. 
 15. See infra Part III.A. 
 16. See 1 RICE, supra note 13, § 6:3. 
 17. Though beyond the scope of this Article, a great many aspects of the privi-
lege have undergone radical changes since their initial inception in the sixteenth cen-
tury.  For more discussion and authorities on this fascinating early development of the 
law of privilege, see 1 RICE, supra note 13, §§ 1:1-2.   
 18. Id. § 6:3. 
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relatively modern innovation.19  A careful review of the history of the preser-
vation requirement reveals it to be the product of little more than the schol-
arly success of John Wigmore and the prevailing jurisprudential notions of 
the early twentieth century.20 
The modern confidentiality requirement of initial confidentiality and the 
attendant mandate that confidentiality be preserved traces its roots directly to 
the ascendance of Wigmore as the leading evidence scholar of the early twen-
tieth century.21  As David Drysdale notes in his extensive and detailed history 
of this topic, the imperative application of the confidentiality requirement 
first came into vogue with Wigmore’s 1899 revision of Professor Simon 
Greenleaf’s earlier seminal treatise “A Treatise on the Law of Evidence.”22  
In that edition, Wigmore introduced the forerunner of what would later be-
come the modern per se “disclosure rule”23 when he added an illustration 
asserting that “[t]he presence of a third person will usually be treated as indi-
cating that the communication was not confidential; moreover, a third person 
who overhears the communication is not within the confidence and may dis-
close what he hears.”24  In the years that followed, Wigmore made the confi-
dentiality requirement explicit – adding that “communications must originate 
in a confidence that they will not be disclosed” as a prerequisite to claiming 
the privilege.25  In short, as Paul Rice has put it, “[t]he concept of confidenti-
ality and secrecy was literally made up by Wigmore in the first edition of his 
treatise.”26   
  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. As the Third Circuit recently explained, “[t]he disclosure rule operates as a 
corollary” to the idea that a privileged communication must originally be made in 
private and away from third parties.  Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE Inc. (In re 
Teleglobe Commc’ns Corps.), 493 F.3d 345, 361 (3d Cir. 2007).  Thus, under the 
disclosure rule, “if a client subsequently shares a privileged communication with a 
third party, then it is no longer confidential, and the privilege ceases to protect it.”  Id.  
This effect is because such an external disclosure signals that the client does not in-
tend to keep the communication secret.  2 RICE, supra note 13, § 9:28. 
 24. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 245 (16th ed. 
1899), available at http://tinyurl.com/4ylzlh9; see also 1 RICE, supra note 13, § 6:3. 
 25. 1 RICE, supra note 13, § 6:3 (quoting 4 JOHN WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE 
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (1905)). 
 26. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion About Attor-
ney Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, and the Source of the Facts 
Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 968 n.5 (1999).  Prof. Rice is not without his 
critics.  For a vigorous challenge to his approach, see Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of 
Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 31 (2000).  Though 
Prof. Leslie makes an interesting case in support of the confidentiality requirement 
(and, by extension, the preservation requirement), her challenge appears to be prem-
ised on a single faulty assumption – that the privilege prevents judicial access to in-
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Importantly, this approach to the privilege was not universally accepted 
or left unchallenged even in Wigmore’s day.27  In fact, as late as the 1950s, it 
remained unsettled whether the privilege could arise in the first place if a 
communication was made in the presence of a third party.28  This dispute was 
not resolved conclusively until Judge Wyzanski expressly held in the land-
mark case United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. that a communica-
tion would not be deemed privileged unless it was made “without the pres-
ence of strangers.”29  Therefore, the fundamental requirement that a commu-
  
formation that would otherwise exist.  Id. at 33 (“[T]he confidentiality requirement 
exists to limit the exclusion of reliable evidence by ensuring that the privilege applies 
to only those statements that would not have been made absent the privilege.”).  Ab-
sent the privilege, however, the communications very likely would not exist.  Paul R. 
Rice, A Bad Idea Dying Hard: A Reply to Professor Leslie’s Defense of the Indefensi-
ble, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (2001) [hereinafter Rice, A Bad Idea Dying Hard] 
(arguing that clients would be less candid with their attorneys if not for the existence 
of the attorney-client privilege).  Arguably, clients would be forced to feed their coun-
sel as little information as possible and leave lawyers to draw their own inferences to 
fill the gaps.  Thus, the judicial process most likely loses very little that would other-
wise exist if the privilege did not protect communications. 
In fact, the costs of limiting the privilege may be higher than affording it a broader 
scope.  Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidential-
ity Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 860 (1998) [hereinafter Rice, The Eroding 
Concept of Confidentiality] (“[P]remising the application of the privilege protection 
on the existence of confidentiality that the client does not desire serves only to restrict 
arbitrarily its application and increase the cost of its use for everyone, with no corre-
sponding benefit.”).  Prof. Leslie makes no allowance for the fact that, presumably, 
full disclosure encourages accurate and ethical confidential counseling in the context 
of litigation.  See id. at 858.  If a client is encouraged to dole out only the minimal 
information possible, then attorneys will be forced to advocate based on that informa-
tion alone.  See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The privi-
lege recognizes that . . . such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being 
fully informed by the client”).  In theory at least, access to greater information cir-
cumscribes the story the client can make their lawyer tell – protecting the truth-
finding function and at least partially offsetting the cost of excluding otherwise rele-
vant material.   
 27. Prof. Drysdale explains that another leading treatise writer, Prof. Burr Jones, 
took a very different view.  See 1 RICE, supra note 13, § 6:3.  Prof. Jones argued that 
communications would only lose their otherwise privileged status due to a lack of 
confidentiality if they were either made in the presence of an adverse party or if 
someone present at the time of the communication subsequently became adverse to 
the client.  Id.  In other words, lack of confidentiality would only be fatal where the 
privilege was invoked to keep an adversary from using information it already knew 
before the litigation.   
 28. See id. 
 29. 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).  Importantly, even Judge Wyzanski 
failed to offer any insight into how he reconciled this mandate with what Prof. Rice 
has characterized as the illogic of the confidentiality requirement.  As Prof. Rice suc-
cinctly put it, “[i]f the client is willing to speak without secrecy, requiring it will not 
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nication be made in confidence has only been a steadfast feature of American 
jurisprudence for roughly sixty years. 
The requirement that confidentiality be maintained has an even more 
dubious pedigree.  Until United Shoe, the question of whether confidentiality 
needed to be preserved to maintain the privilege was, and in large part still 
remains, ancillary to the threshold question of whether confidentiality even 
mattered.  And, unlike the underlying requirement that an original communi-
cation be made in confidence, the duty to preserve confidentiality appears to 
be something of an accepted aberration that lacks a clear organic origin or 
single source.  As Professor Rice explains, early privilege was not a function 
of “confidences” so much as “secrets.”30  In other words, “[t]he attorney-
client privilege was premised upon the confidential nature of the attorney-
client relationship – the attorney's obligation not to reveal what his client had 
communicated to him – not upon the confidential or secret nature of the 
communications.”31   
As the confidentiality requirement took hold, so too did a requirement 
that a party must use the privilege in a manner that was equitable.  Courts 
quickly declined to permit a party to use privileged information offensively 
and then assert the privilege when that same information or related material 
was invoked against them – the so-called “sword and shield” prohibition.32  
As Professor Rice’s collected cases indicate, this appeal to equity gave rise to 
a rule where subsequent disclosure of attorney-client privileged material de-
stroyed the privilege.33  But it is a significant leap from requiring equitable 
use of privileged information to requiring absolute preservation of confidenti-
ality in the context of eavesdroppers, inadvertent recipients, or, as is the sub-
ject of this Article, court-sanctioned exchanges of information designed to 
expeditiously advance pending litigation.  Nonetheless, this leap became the 
  
increase the client's candor.”  Rice, The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality, supra 
note 26, at 860.  Ironically, it is the disclosure rule itself that provides the only, albeit 
circular, retort – clients who would speak without secrecy demand secrecy because it 
is required to preserve the privilege.  
 30. Rice, The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 868 n.38.   
 31. Id. at 868. 
 32. See, e.g., Sims v. Blot (In re Sims), 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In 
other words, a party cannot partially disclose privileged communications or affirma-
tively rely on privileged communications to support its claim or defense and then 
shield the underlying communications from scrutiny by the opposing party.” (altera-
tion in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added))).  Wigmore also ap-
pears to have originated this aptly named and commonly invoked privilege doctrine.  
See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2388 (“[The privilege] is not to be both a sword and 
a shield (in Lord Mansfield’s phrase concerning an infant’s exemption from liabil-
ity).”). 
 33. See Rice, The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 871 n.45 
(collecting cases and noting that voluntary disclosures by the client for the purpose of 
securing an advantage after the initial communication often work as a waiver). 
7
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modern disclosure rule.34  Thus, it appears that the modern requirement that a 
party preserve confidentiality flows from a logical and equitable rule prohibit-
ing abuse of the privilege.  Unfortunately, that reasonable approach has 
morphed into a per se rule imposing extraordinary cost before ever acknowl-
edging or assessing the equities of a given case.35 
Ultimately, the requirements of initial and preserved confidentiality do 
not deserve their vaunted place in the law of privilege.  They are not 
grounded in centuries of trial and error like the privilege itself.  Nor are they a 
product of some popular democratic process or collective scholarly endeavor.  
Instead, they represent two extraordinary aberrations in the much longer his-
tory of the privilege that, in their short life, have been heavily assailed and 
gradually eroded by an array of judicially created exceptions and limitations. 
B.  Confidentiality's Death by a Thousand Cuts 
For decades, the preservation requirement has faced a series of assaults 
from both litigants and the bench.  It struggled through the rise and fall of 
selective waiver.36  It marched onward as courts developed elaborate frame-
works to address inadvertent disclosures because the volume of discovery 
material had increased exponentially.37  It persisted still as actual exceptions 
were carved out of the disclosure rule to authorize the sharing of information 
in an increasing variety of cases.38  Protective orders and other sealing de-
  
 34. FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 35. FED. R. EVID. 502 explanatory note to advisory committee notes. 
 36. For an updated review of the tortured history of selective waiver, see Patrick 
M. Emery, Comment, The Death of Selective Waiver: How New Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 502 Ends the Nationalization Debate, 27 J.L. & COM. 231, 248-66 (2009).  As 
discussed infra, selective waiver played a special role in the development of Rule 502.  
See infra Part III.B.  Though originally included in the mandate to the Judicial Con-
ference, efforts to address selective waiver died by the time the draft rule was submit-
ted to Congress.  See infra note 62 and accompanying text.  Nonetheless, the intrica-
cies of selective waiver case law and the various policy arguments for and against it 
are implicitly addressed by the new mantra of non-waiver embodied in Rule 502(d).  
See infra Part III.B. 
 37. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Under Armour, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 761, 766-67, 766 
n.3 (D. Md. 2008) (providing a recent survey of the three major approaches to inad-
vertent waiver used in state and federal court); see also Elizabeth King, Waving 
Goodbye to Waiver? Not So Fast: Inadvertent Disclosure, Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege, and Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 467, 472-
90 (2010) (identifying various approaches to disclosure). 
 38. The two most noteworthy exceptions in this area are the joint defense privi-
lege and the community of interest privilege.  Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE Inc. 
(In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corps.), 493 F.3d 345, 362-66 (3d Cir. 2007).  The for-
mer exception preserves privilege when a communication is disclosed to another 
individual represented by the same lawyer in the same matter.  Id. at 363.  The latter, 
a far more complicated exception, “comes into play when clients with separate attor-
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vices – once extraordinary – have become unremarkable, commonplace tools 
invoked as a matter of course.39  What is more, these various carve-outs, ex-
ceptions, and external protections vary, in some cases dramatically, from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.40  In short, the confidentiality and preservation 
requirements of the attorney-client privilege have become little more than a 
hedgerow maze of technicalities.  On the one hand, existing jurisprudence 
requires that parties preserve confidentiality at extraordinary expense even 
where they would be inclined to share the information if only they could re-
tain control over their documents as to the rest of the world.41  At the same 
time, parties escape the harsh consequences of the disclosure rule and atten-
dant costs in the circumstances that may actually be most detrimental to the 
truth-finding function of the trial process – such as where multiple parties 
seek to coordinate their defense by sharing information that they could not 
otherwise access to the disadvantage of the opposing party.42   
The preservation and confidentiality requirements, both of which rest 
upon questionable foundations as discussed supra, have begotten an array of 
common law caveats that have left these requirements at cross-purposes with 
their original functions.  The once “tight circle” of privilege, to use Professor 
Rice’s terminology, has now expanded to eclipse much of the original rule.43  
As that circle continues to grow, the examples discussed above seem to ren-
der the rule all the more arbitrary and lead to the disturbing consequence of 
only enforcing the disclosure rules in situations that least advance the judicial 
process.  At the end of the day, the high-minded principles and evidence-
saving goal of the preservation requirement are no longer vindicated by im-
posing the onerous responsibility of maintaining secrecy at all costs.  Put 
differently, the slow death of the disclosure rule appears to reflect the judicial 
recognition that, so long as privileged information is used fairly in one in-
  
neys share otherwise privileged information in order to coordinate their legal activi-
ties.”  Id. at 359. 
 39. See Judges: Too Many Civil Cases Kept Secret, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 13, 
2011. 
 40. See generally Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of 
Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 
502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211 (2006) (discussing disclosures made at the federal and state 
levels).  Importantly, Profs. Broun and Capra offer authoritative current scholarship 
on the thought process behind Rule 502 as both professors were members of the Judi-
cial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules at the time Rule 502 was 
first proposed.  Id. at 211 n.a1. 
 41. See Rice, The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 860-61. 
 42. In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 359; see also Rice, The Erod-
ing Concept of Confidentiality, supra note 26 at 890-91. 
 43. Rice, A Bad Idea Dying Hard, supra note 26, at 189-98; see also Rice, The 
Eroding Concept of Confidentiality, supra note 26, at 880-88 (asserting that the de-
velopment of client intent-driven waviers and of wavier exceptions occurred when 
confidentiality ceased to be a requisite for attorney-client privilege and was replaced 
by fairness and client intent). 
9
Correll: Correll: Troubling Ambition of Federal Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
File: CorrellPaginated.docx Created on:  6/24/13 9:21 PM Last Printed: 10/23/13 8:39 PM 
1040 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
stance with one adversary, there is simply no justification to hold the privi-
lege waived as to the rest of the world.  After all, the rest of the world loses 
nothing by allowing litigants added flexibility where evidence would not 
otherwise publically exist absent the privilege.   
The preservation requirement has experienced a steady decline in 
authority, and that decline shows no sign of slowing.  At this juncture, the 
potential merits and adverse consequences of that decline are beyond the 
scope of this Article.44  Instead, this gradual-but-hastening shift highlights 
one of the more recent problems further contributing to the extraordinary 
costs attached to protecting attorney-client privileged materials – unpredict-
ability.  With so many exceptions and so many jurisdiction-specific variations 
on how those exceptions are viewed, a party must think twice before relaxing 
its guard and sharing information in reliance on any of these erosions of the 
preservation requirement.  The addition of Rule 502(d) orders to this pan-
theon may signal the final step in the slow demise of the requirement for 
maintained confidentiality as it adds an element of predictability as well as 
legislative and judicial approval to abandoning Wigmore’s theory.  That ter-
minal decline may, as discussed infra, justify a far-reaching evidentiary rule 
that consolidates these scattered common law creations into a predictable and 
ordered system for administering the privilege.45   
III.  THE PROMULGATION OF RULE 502 AND ATTENDANT 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Rule 502 is different.  Unlike the run of evidence rules, it addresses 
privilege.46  Thus, it falls within the strictures of 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b).  Under 
that statute, the Supreme Court’s broad power to develop evidentiary rules is 
limited, albeit narrowly, by a requirement that “[a]ny such rule creating, abol-
ishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect 
unless approved by Act of Congress.”47  As a consequence, Rule 502 has an 
extensive and detailed legislative history providing critical insight into what 
the Judicial Conference and Congress understood the new rule to mean.  Fo-
cusing primarily on subparagraph (d) of the rule, this Part examines the de-
velopment of the rule from the initiation of the rule-making process, through 
the detailed reports of the Judicial Conference, to the substantial floor debate, 
and the rule’s passage with an unusual “statement of congressional intent” 
aimed at providing targeted guidance to future courts. 
  
 44. For competing views on that subject, see Rice, The Eroding Concept of Con-
fidentiality, supra note 26 (arguing that the benefits outweigh the potential conse-
quences) and Leslie, supra note 26, at 84 (arguing that the eliminating the require-
ment would drastically harm the judicial process). 
 45. See infra Part IV.B. 
 46. See FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2006). 
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A.  The History of Rule 502(d) 
Rule 502 grew out of a 2006 letter from Congressman Bob Sensenbren-
ner, on behalf of the House Committee on the Judiciary, to the Judicial Con-
ference.48  In that letter, Representative Sensenbrenner charged the Judicial 
Conference with initiating a rule-making process to address “forfeiture of 
privileges.”49  He narrowed the focus of this request to three particular prob-
lems: (1) protection against forfeitures attributable to “innocent mistake;” (2) 
authorization to protect disclosures of information between parties in pending 
litigation; and (3) allowing parties to cooperate with government agencies by 
turning over privileged materials without waiving privilege as to other par-
ties.50  The letter explained that satisfying these three objectives would help 
to reduce “[t]he expense in reviewing an enormous volume” of discovery 
materials while also creating consistency in the enforcement of privilege rules 
between different proceedings and varying judicial “fora.”51   
In response to Representative Sensenbrenner’s letter, the Judicial Con-
ference undertook a painstaking twenty-month rule-making effort.52  The 
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules initiated its process with a confer-
ence and public hearing at Fordham University in April 2006.53  From there, 
it developed a first draft of the new rule and made it publicly available for 
comment in August 2006.54  Over the next six months, the Advisory Commit-
tee received more than seventy public comments from practitioners, profes-
sors, state bar organizations, interest groups, and federal agencies.55  These 
comments addressed virtually every facet of the proposed rule.56  The Com-
  
 48. See Letter from Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House of Rep-
resentatives Comm. on the Judiciary, to Mr. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director, 
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Sensenbrenner Letter], 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesAndPolicies/rules/2006-01-23-
Sensenbrenner.pdf. 
 49. Id. at 1. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1-2. 
 52. See Letter from Lee H. Roenthal, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Pro-
cedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary & Sen. Arlen Specter, Ranking Member, Comm. on the 
Judiciary (Sept. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Rule 502 Letter to Congress], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesAndPolicies/rules/Hill_Letter_re_EV_502.pdf. 
 53. See generally ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES: HEARING ON 
PROPOSAL 502 (Apr. 24, 2006) (transcript on file with author). 
 54. Rule 502 Letter to Congress, supra note 52, at 2. 
 55. ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 15-49 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter PROPOSED AMENDMENT] (summary of public comment), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/2007-05-
Committee_Report-Evidence.pdf. 
 56. Id.  
11
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mittee made two critical changes in response to these public critiques: (1) it 
eliminated (before ultimately including but bracketing) a provision of the 
proposed rule codifying selective waiver; and (2) it adjusted the language of 
the proposed rule to allow courts to protect disclosures without prior agree-
ment by the parties.57  The carefully honed product of this process was finally 
transmitted to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure on 
May 15, 2007, and it was subsequently delivered to Congress roughly four 
months later with only a handful of minor changes.58   
The accompanying report to Congress explained that the new rule 
sought to limit the scope of waiver, prevent unfair consequences from attach-
ing to inadvertent disclosures, and provide an element of security to parties 
mired in the unpredictable world of common law exceptions to the disclosure 
  
 57. Id. at 15; see also ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE 
RULES 4 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 ADVISORY COMM. REPORT], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/2007-05-
Committee_Report-Evidence.pdf.  The Advisory Committee also directly incorpo-
rated a number of other changes proposed by members of the public, including em-
phasizing “that the protections of Rule 502 apply in all cases in federal court, includ-
ing cases in which state law provides the rule of decision” and “stressing that Rule 
502 appl[ies] in state court to determine whether a disclosure previously made at a 
federal level constitutes a waiver . . . .”  See PROPOSED AMENDENDMENT, supra note 
55, at 14. 
 58. 2007 ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 57, at 1; COMM. ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED NEW 
EVIDENCE RULE 502 1-4 (2007) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT] (at-
tached to Rule 502 Letter to Congress, supra note 54), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesAndPolicies/rules/Hill_Letter_re_EV_502.pdf.  
Notably, the Standing Committee did make a few stylistic revisions to subparagraph 
(d).  The original version proposed by the Advisory Committee read: 
(d)  Controlling effect of court order.  – A federal court may order that 
the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the 
litigation pending before the court.  The order binds all persons and enti-
ties in all federal or state proceedings, whether or not they were parties to 
the litigation. 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT, supra note 55, at 3.  The subsequent version transmitted to 
Congress by the Standing Committee read: 
(d)  Controlling effect of a court order.  – A federal court may order that 
the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the 
litigation pending before the court – in which event the disclosure is also 
not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 3.  The change in the final clause of 
the rule suggests at least a mild reluctance to portray the new rule as authorizing 
courts to decide the rights of absent parties, an issue discussed infra in Part V.  As 
enacted, the rule incorporates the Standing Committee’s approach without amend-
ment.  See FED. R. EVID. 502(d).  
12
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rule.59  With respect to subparagraph (d), the Standing Committee explained 
that the “provision allows parties in an action in which such an order is en-
tered to limit their costs of pre-production privilege review.”60  In so doing, 
the Standing Committee appears to have either intentionally or accidentally 
given the impression that Rule 502(d) orders were somehow linked primarily 
to the inadvertent disclosure issues addressed in subparagraph (b).  After all, 
Representative Sensenbrenner’s letter and numerous public comments appear 
to attribute the entire cost-savings justification to privilege reviews employed 
to prevent inadvertent disclosure waivers.61  Notably, subparagraph (d) re-
ceived no further attention in the Standing Committee’s report (or in the Ad-
visory Committee’s earlier report for that matter).  In fact, none of the Judi-
cial Conference materials – save the broad language of the rule itself – her-
alded the extraordinary grant of power created by the order provision of the 
Rule. 
In Congress, the proposed rule met with broad acceptance and vocal 
support.  Other than rejecting the selective waiver provision bracketed by the 
Judicial Conference, Congress made no meaningful changes to the rule.62  In 
the House, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson-Lee urged the new rule’s passage, 
noting that something needed to be done “to address a growing problem that 
is adding inordinate and unnecessary burden, expense, uncertainty, and inef-
ficiency to litigation.”63  Representative Jackson-Lee identified the potential 
cost-savings and the rule’s ability to remedy the unfairness of inadvertent 
waiver and subject matter waiver as the primary changes wrought by the 
bill.64  Congressman Steve King voiced his support on the grounds that the 
new rule was justified by a “spike[]” in the cost of discovery and his belief 
that the new rule would fix the broken system of assessing waiver “by provid-
ing a predictable standard . . . .”65  In the Senate, Senator Patrick Leahy 
pressed for the adoption of the new rule for many of the same reasons.66  He 
argued that “[b]illions of dollars are spent each year in litigation to protect 
against the inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials” – a problem made 
  
 59. Rule 502 Letter to Congress, supra note 52, at 3-4. 
 60. Id. at 4. 
 61. Sensenbrenner Letter, supra note 48, at 1; PROPOSED AMENDMENT, supra 
note 55, at 18 (comment of George L. Paul, Esq.), 21 (comment of Paul J. Neale, 
Esq.), 22 (comment of Michael J. O’Connor, Esq.), 27 (comment of Patrick Oot, 
Esq.), and 37 (comment of the Federal Magistrate Judges Association). 
 62. Compare JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 1-4, with Act of 
Sept. 19, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537 (2008). 
 63. 154 CONG. REC. H7817 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee). 
 64. See id. at H7817-18. 
 65. Id. at H7819 (statement of Rep. King). 
 66. 153 CONG. REC. S15141-42 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2007) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
13
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worse by the increasing primacy of electronic documents.67  Senator Arlen 
Specter cited his belief that “[c]urrent law on attorney-client privilege and 
work product is responsible in large part for the rising costs of discovery[.]”68  
In perhaps the only congressional statement truly addressing the scope of 
subparagraph (d), Senator Specter also noted that “[the rule] permits parties 
and courts to protect against the consequences of waiver by permitting limited 
disclosure of privileged information between the parties to litigation.”69  Un-
fortunately, Senator Specter’s statement offered no insight into the nature or 
source of the limitations he believed would circumscribe the courts’ authority 
to prevent waiver.70   
The other available pieces of legislative history provide little additional 
guidance.  The Senate report on the new rule identified high discovery costs 
associated with preventing inadvertent disclosures as the primary motivation 
for the new law, noting that “the costs of privilege review are often wholly 
disproportionate to the overall cost of the case.”71  The report states that the 
purpose of the new rule is to create a predictable, uniform standard that im-
proves the efficiency of the discovery process.72  After further discussing 
inadvertent disclosures, the report addresses the new authority of the district 
courts to enter binding orders under Rule 502(d) but only as an instrument of 
uniformity and predictability.73  It does not comment on the scope of that new 
authority. 
Congress did, however, provide one more piece of important legislative 
history.  Though the congressional record on Rule 502 is somewhat sparse, 
Congress took the unusual step of issuing a “Statement of Congressional In-
tent Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence” to be attached to 
the explanatory Advisory Committee notes provided with the rule.74  Though 
not itself law, the special placement of this material as an addendum to the 
normally authoritative Advisory Committee notes has led some early courts 
to grant it more weight than ordinary legislative history materials.75  The 
  
 67. Id. at S15142. 
 68. Id. (statement of Sen. Specter). 
 69. Id. at S15143 (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. at S15142-43. 
 71. S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 2 (2008), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1305-06. 
 72. Id. at 3. 
 73. Id. at 2-3. 
 74. See FED. R. EVID. 502 addendum to advisory committee notes; see also 154 
CONG. REC. H7818 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (adding 
the “Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence” to the Congressional Record). 
 75. See, e.g., Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, No. 08-2638-CM-DWJ, 2010 WL 
2949582, at *4 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010) (citing the Statement to find that Rule 502(d) 
confers sua sponte authority); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 
125, 134 (S.D. W.Va. 2010) (relying on the Statement to interpret the “[f]airness 
[c]onsiderations” included in Rule 502(b)), objections overruled sub nom. Felman 
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Statement describes the “limited though important … focus of the rule” 
thusly:  
The rule addresses only the effect of disclosure, under specified 
circumstances, of a communication that is otherwise protected by 
attorney-client privilege, or of information that is protected by 
work-product protection, on whether the disclosure itself operates 
as a waiver of the privilege or protection for purposes of admissi-
bility of evidence in a federal or state judicial or administrative 
proceeding.76   
Again, however, though Congress took great pains to suggest the rule is 
limited, it did not identify the limitations it envisioned.  The Statement sug-
gests that the “sword and shield” prohibition remains intact and underscores 
the importance of equitable application of the rule (arguably the same limita-
tion) but stops short of demarcating any other boundaries.77  Specifically with 
respect to subparagraph (d), it simply reiterates the codified requirement that 
a court may only enter orders in litigation before a disclosure and highlights 
the fact that courts may enter Rule 502(d) orders sua sponte.78  It does not 
purport to restrict Rule 502(d) orders to issues of subject matter waiver and 
inadvertent disclosure, nor does it address court-sanctioned voluntary disclo-
sure.79   
Rule 502 passed through both the House and the Senate without opposi-
tion,80 and President Bush signed it into law without noteworthy comment.81  
Rule 502 became effective on September 19, 2008.82 
B.  Taking Meaning From Gaps in the Legislative History of Rule 502 
Like the rule itself, the legislative history of Rule 502 is very different 
from the run of statutes.  On the one hand, Congress carefully developed a 
substantial record explaining, justifying, and clarifying their decision to fun-
  
Prod., Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, No. 3:09-048, 2010 WL 2944777 (S.D. W.Va. July 
23, 2010).  But see Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 275 F.R.D. 
43, 48-49 (D. Mass. 2011) (declining to apply the Statement in light of contradictory 
plain language of the rule itself).  
 76. 154 CONG. REC. H7818. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at H7819 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at H7820 (House passage); 154 CONG. REC. S1318-19 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 
2008) (Senate passage). 
 81. Acts Approved by the President, 44 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1234 (Sept. 
19, 2008). 
 82. Act of Sept. 19, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537 (2008). 
15
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damentally alter the law of privilege in federal courts.83  On the other hand, 
the constant specter of selective waiver and its de facto realization under Rule 
502(d) suggest Congress acted with something like willful blindness in ratify-
ing such a far-reaching law.  In other words, with Rule 502, Congress seemed 
to recognize that the privilege itself is an artificial creature of fiat, and fiats 
are inherently malleable to the needs of those institutions with the authority to 
change the rules.  But Congress stopped short of acknowledging the full ex-
tent of its ability to reform the disclosure rule without completely setting it 
aside. 
The legislative history set out supra makes it clear that Congress was 
concerned about two basic issues when it created Rule 502: (1) cost and (2) 
uniformity.  Though the fairness of current waiver provisions played a secon-
dary role,84 these two concerns stood out as major stimuli animating this rule-
making process.  To achieve both of these goals, Congress resolved long-
standing conflicts about the proper disposition of inadvertent waivers.85  It 
clarified the effects of agreements by the parties to warn that such agree-
ments, in themselves, would not preserve privilege.86  And, most important to 
this discussion, it granted courts the authority to enter confidentiality orders 
that are enforceable against future third parties.87  More generally, reducing 
or eliminating the “billions” spent on privilege review referenced by Senator 
Leahy served as the popular refrain offered to justify the strongly-worded 
provisions of the new rule. 88 The chorus of cost reduction was repeated again 
and again from Representative Sensenbrenner's original letter through the 
bill’s ultimate enactment in September 2008. 89 
What is more noteworthy about the legislative history of this rule is 
what it does not address.  Again, whether by conscious omission or simple 
oversight, Congress failed to provide any guidance as to what boundaries, if 
any, circumscribe Rule 502(d).  Congress did not explain why, for instance, 
Rule 502(d) creates the legal fiction that a court-sanctioned disclosure is “not 
a waiver” rather than simply acknowledge that the rule authorizes a limited 
waiver with court approval.  Congress also did not explain, though at least 
  
 83. See supra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.  
 84. See generally Rule 502 Letter to Congress, supra note 52, at 1-2.  The sec-
ondary emphasis on the equity of uniformity is also clearly conveyed by the various 
statements made during floor debate discussed and cited above.  See supra note 51 
and accompanying text.    
 85. See King, supra note 37, at 472-85 (explaining the three major approaches to 
inadvertent waiver – the “lenient approach,” the “strict approach,” and the “middle 
approach” – that were in place at the time Rule 502 became law and Congress’s con-
scious choice to select the moderate approach).   
 86. See FED. R. EVID. 502(e). 
 87. FED. R. EVID. 502(d); see also King, supra note 37, at 503-04. 
 88. 153 CONG. REC. S15141-42 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2007) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy).  
 89. Sensenbrenner Letter, supra note 48, at 1. 
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some legislators and other secondary authorities certainly suggested,90 if it 
meant to make Rule 502(d) merely a vehicle to effectuate the goals of Rule 
502(a) and Rule 502(b).  While the format of the rule suggests that Congress 
intended such a limitation, the text of the rule makes no such concession. 
Another noteworthy aspect of the development of Rule 502 was the 
quiet death of the selective waiver provision originally developed by the Ad-
visory Committee.  In his original letter, Representative Sensenbrenner un-
abashedly called for the legislative adoption of selective waiver when he re-
quested a new rule that would “allow persons and entities to cooperate with 
government agencies by turning over privileged information without waiving 
all privileges as to other parties in subsequent litigation.”91  Based on that 
request, the Advisory Committee developed such a provision and subjected it 
to public comment.92  But, in the face of strong public opposition, it dropped 
the provision.93   
What is noteworthy about this series of amendments, however, is not 
that selective waiver was omitted from the rule.94  Instead, what is notable is 
  
 90. See 153 CONG. REC. S15143 (statement of Sen. Specter) (describing the rule 
as “permitting limited disclosure”); Rule 502 Letter to Congress, supra note 52, at 4 
(describing Rule 502(d) as providing enforceability in state and federal proceedings). 
 91. Sensenbrenner Letter, supra note 48, at 1. 
 92. The selective waiver provision ultimately dropped from the rule read: 
(c) Selective waiver. – In a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a 
communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or 
work product protection – when made to a federal public office or agency 
in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority – 
does not operate as a waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of non-
governmental persons or entities. The effect of disclosure to a state or lo-
cal government agency, with respect to non-governmental persons or enti-
ties, is governed by applicable state law. Nothing in this rule limits or ex-
pands the authority of a government agency to disclose communications 
or information to other government agencies or as otherwise authorized or 
required by law. 
ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT 
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITEE. ON EVIDENCE RULES: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 6 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 ADVISORY COMM. REPORT], 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/EV05-
2006.pdf.  
 93. 2007 ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 57, at 4. 
 94. For more on the demise of selective waiver and the justifications underlying 
that policy choice, see generally Emery, supra note 36.  As Mr. Emery’s comment 
makes clear, the troubled history of selective waiver and its coalition of enemies made 
it unlikely to ever enjoy widespread adoption either as a function of common law 
development or legislative action.  Id. at 297.  Mr. Emery’s argument stops short of 
acknowledging that Rule 502 creates a functional equivalent to selective waiver.  Id. 
at 293.  Nonetheless, he does persuasively (and correctly) argue that the new rule so 
effectively accommodates the various concerns that have promoted selective waiver 
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that no one in the rule-making process appears to have acknowledged that the 
rule, through legal fiction, allows district courts to sanction a new breed of 
limited waiver.  Rule 502(d) empowers a court to declare that a disclosure 
will not constitute a waiver.  Admittedly, that concept differs from selective 
waiver because a “selective waiver,” by definition, involves a waiver as to 
one party but not as to other parties.95  Still, the practical effect is the same: 
one party gets to see (and perhaps use) otherwise privileged documents while 
the rest of the world is still blocked by the disclosing party's ability to assert 
the privilege in other litigation.  Though the Statement on Congressional In-
tent states that Rule 502(d) “does not provide a basis for a court to enable 
parties to agree to a selective waiver of the privilege,”96 it neither suggests the 
alternative non-waiver approach is somehow barred, nor does it otherwise 
indicate where the actual limit of Rule 502(d) authority lies.97  
  
in the past so as to effectively render any further resort to selective waiver unneces-
sary.  Id. at 232. 
 95. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 1991); see also Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 
1977) (en banc) (originating the selective waiver doctrine).  See generally Alexander 
F. Smith, Comment, Should Congress Adopt Selective Waiver Legislation?, 80 TEMP. 
L. REV. 595 (2007) (evaluating the history and status of selective waiver circa the 
adoption of Rule 502). 
 96. Fed. R. Evid. 502 addendum to advisory committee notes.  
 97. See id.  At most, the Statement of Congressional Intent prohibits willing 
acquiescence to the use of privileged material.  See id.  But this purported limitation is 
something of a straw man.  First, proponents of selective waiver make clear that the 
primary purpose of the rule is to permit cooperation and openness in government 
investigations.  See, e.g., Andrew J. McNally, Comment, Revitalizing Selective 
Waiver: Encouraging Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing by Restricting 
Third Party Access to Disclosed Material, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 823, 824-25 
(2005) (arguing that selective waiver “aligns corporations’ interests in maintaining 
crime-free operations and the government’s interest in ensuring that applicable laws 
are followed”).  In many instances, just opening the books to federal investigators will 
be sufficient to accomplish these ends as the investigators will be satisfied with what 
they find and the investigation will terminate.  See William S. Laufer, Corporate 
Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 645-46 
(2002) (exploring the way in which “organizational cooperation and acceptance of 
responsibility,” including various privilege waivers, often leads to “mitigation, excul-
pation, or absolution”); see also Memorandum from The Deputy Attorney Gen., 
Dep’t of Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys 3 (June 16, 1999), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-
corps.PDF (instructing United States prosecutors that a corporation’s willingness to 
waive privilege over requested material should be considered in deciding whether to 
bring charges).  Second, while Rule 502(d) covers disclosure, Rule 502(a) covers use.  
FED. R. EVID. 502(a), (d).  Thus, even in a worst case scenario, a party relying on Rule 
502(d) to disclose materials would face, at most, only a limited waiver (as opposed to 
a subject matter waiver) if the disclosed material is “used” by the government in an 
actual judicial or administrative proceeding.    
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Ultimately, the otherwise detailed legislative history of Rule 502 does 
little to address, much less circumscribe, the extraordinarily broad language 
of Rule 502(d).  While Congress made passing references to limiting district 
court authority and openly repudiated any suggestion it was embracing selec-
tive waiver, it never stopped to discuss the actual boundaries it envisioned.  
As a consequence, courts have been left with the exceptionally broad plain 
language of a rule that appears to afford district courts virtually unfettered 
discretion to manipulate the common law rules of privilege waiver in what-
ever way best serves the needs of the litigation before them.  It is unclear 
whether these omissions were intentional or simply borne of the lack of oppo-
sition to the new rule.  Regardless, as discussed in Part IV, Rule 502(d)'s 
sweeping language and the lack of guidance as to its limits have served as the 
catalyst behind what can only be described as a nascent revolution in both the 
law of privilege and the practical realities of discovery.  
IV.  THE RISE OF RULE 502(D) 
District courts around the country wasted no time resorting to their new-
est discovery tool following the enactment of Rule 502.  Though initial usage 
was tempered by a lack of awareness of the new rule,98 the rule has nonethe-
less generated an increasing number of cases over the past three years.  Ad-
mittedly, much of the early case law has focused on the primary area intended 
by Congress – inadvertent disclosures.99  Nonetheless, Rule 502 has not been 
so limited.  Instead, it has grown rapidly in a variety of directions to address 
an increasing number of discovery problems.  Most notably, the early Rule 
502 case law reflects a steady movement toward a broad system of court-
sanctioned non-waiver.   
This Part tracks the early development of the rule over the past three 
years.  First, it examines the rapid, albeit largely predictable, spread of Rule 
502(a) and Rule 502(b) as major discovery mechanisms used almost as a 
matter of course in a number of different settings.  Second, it addresses the 
particularly unusual development of Rule 502(d).  Even in its early applica-
tions, Rule 502(d) has served as something of a flashpoint for controversy 
and confusion – resulting in no less than three distinct approaches to the new 
rule.  These divergences may not be sufficiently developed at present to be 
viewed as absolute and insular.  Still, they nonetheless clearly reflect three 
different schools of thought on how the district courts’ newfound authority 
should be used.  
  
 98. Hon. Paul W. Grimm et al., Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Has It Lived Up 
to its Potential?, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, at *2 (2011) (providing a judicial evalua-
tion of Rule 502, and arguing that part of Rule 502’s slow development can be attrib-
uted to the fact that “a disappointingly small number of lawyers seem to be aware of 
the rule and its potential, despite the fact that the rule is over two years old”). 
 99. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
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A.  Early Applications of Rule 502(a) and Rule 502(b) 
A brief explanation of the early development of Rule 502(a) and Rule 
502(b) is necessary to give context to the early development of Rule 502(d).  
Without question, Rule 502(d) has not been the primary focus of the early 
case law addressing the broader rule.  Instead, as one would expect, courts 
and practitioners have devoted most of their efforts to using the new rule for 
its much-heralded dual purposes: correcting problems associated with inad-
vertent disclosure and limiting subject matter waivers.  The early cases evalu-
ating, analyzing, and ultimately applying Rule 502(a) and Rule 502(b) dem-
onstrate a number of interesting and important features that provide a better 
understanding of how district courts view this latest addition to the federal 
rules.   
1.  Rule 502(b) 
Though it appears second in the text of the rule, Rule 502(b)’s stan-
dardization of the strictures governing inadvertent disclosures represents the 
single biggest change wrought by Congress’s rule-making efforts.  The fact 
that Rule 502(b) is the focal point of the new rule should come as no surprise.  
Inadvertent disclosure concerns were cited as the driving force behind the 
exponential growth in discovery costs.100  Further, the common law inadver-
tent disclosure jurisprudence had split into three, inconsistent variations – 
producing the primary inconsistency that troubled Congress.101  Still, the im-
mediate and frequent application of Rule 502(b) has produced several inter-
esting and surprising developments that may provide insight into the future of 
the less-cited Rule 502(d).  Specifically, early Rule 502(b) jurisprudence has 
(1) relied on the Advisory Committee materials and legislative history to an 
extraordinary extent; (2) diverged on key interpretive issues regarding what a 
party must do to receive protection from the rule; and (3) begun to demon-
strate something of an inverse correlation between the breadth afforded to 
Rule 502(b) and other parts of the rule. 
A few cases have applied Rule 502(b) without issue and in keeping with 
what the legislative history suggests Congress intended.  One such example is 
Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.102  In Datel, a plaintiff sought to make 
use of a number of privileged emails contained in a larger, non-privileged 
  
 100. 154 CONG. REC. H7817 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee); 153 CONG. REC. S15142 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy).; 
see Sensenbrenner Letter, supra note 48, at 1. 
 101. King, supra note 37, at 472-85; see also S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 2 (2008), 
reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1305-06 (“The bill addresses these problems by pro-
viding a predictable and consistent standard to govern the waiver of privileged infor-
mation.”). 
 102. No. C-09-05535, 2011 WL 866993 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011). 
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chain that had been inadvertently disclosed due to a “computer glitch.”103  In 
response, the Datel court carefully walked through each of the three prongs 
set forth in Rule 502(b).  First, it rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the 
term “inadvertent” excluded “‘ill-considered production, or production made 
without bothering to acquire a complete understanding of the four corners of 
a particular document.”104  Instead, the district court found that an accidental 
and unintentional disclosure produced by a software malfunction fell squarely 
within the definition of an “inadvertent disclosure.”105  The district court then 
turned to the defendant’s efforts to prevent the inadvertent disclosure and 
concluded that “[i]nadvertent production of a relatively low proportion of 
documents in a large production under a short timetable due to mistake 
should be and usually is excused.”106  Citing the Advisory Committee’s note, 
the district court refused to require post-production reviews as a precondition 
to invoking Rule 502(b) protections.107  Finally, the district court concluded 
that the defendant’s prompt objection and assertion of privilege when the 
inadvertently produced emails were presented at a deposition was adequate to 
satisfy the timeliness prong of Rule 502(b) analysis.108  Accordingly, the dis-
trict court held that the production “was inadvertent and did not constitute a 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine.”109  In 
short, the district court refused to find waiver where the disclosure was truly 
accidental, the production was large, and the producing party quickly sought 
to rectify the situation – exactly what the authors of the various reports and 
other legislative documents discussed supra likely envisioned. 
Notwithstanding the straightforward nature of the Datel court’s analysis, 
the balance of Rule 502(b) cases has not necessarily proceeded so smoothly.  
First, the proper method for interpreting the basic language of the rule has 
proven to be a matter of some controversy.  Given the rule’s relative novelty, 
some district courts have relied heavily – even exclusively – on legislative 
history materials to define concepts as basic as the meaning of “inadver-
tent.”110  Other district courts have resorted to pre-rule case law for guid-
  
 103. Id. at *3. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at *4. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at *5. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125, 133-34 (S.D. 
W.Va. 2010) (looking to the advisory committee note on Rule 502(b) to provide a 
standard for assessing inadvertence), objections overruled sub nom. Felman Prod., 
Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, No. 3:09-048, 2010 WL 2944777 (S.D. W.Va. July 23, 
2010); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. N.H. Ins. Co., No. 2:04-cv-03027-STA-cgc, 2011 
WL 1930703, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. May 19, 2011) (same with respect to Rule 502(a)), 
supplemented, No. 2:04-CV-03027-STA-cgc, 2011 WL 2462215 (W.D. Tenn. June 
17, 2011).  But see Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 275 F.R.D. 
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ance.111  Still, others have limited themselves to the plain language and relied 
upon dictionaries to supply definitions for key terms.112  What these ap-
proaches suggest for Rule 502(d) – particularly in light of the crucial interpre-
tive debate already emerging with respect to its broad parameters – is that 
courts may well consider and afford greater weight to secondary sources of 
authority that would not ordinarily enjoy such prominence and influence.113   
Second, a clear divide has already emerged with respect to the sorts of 
preventative requirements imposed by Rule 502(b)(2).  In Relion, Inc. v. Hy-
dra Fuel Cell Corp., the district court concluded that Rule 502(b)(2) requires 
parties to employ “all reasonable means” to prevent inadvertent disclosure 
before they can invoke the protections of the rule.114  Imposing this particu-
larly stringent standard, the Relion court refused to permit a party to clawback 
two emails inadvertently disclosed amidst forty linear feet of files because the 
requesting party had been permitted to make a set of copies in addition to the 
  
43, 49 (D.Mass., 2011) (explaining that the plain language of the rule trumps any 
statement of intent or advisory materials).  
 111. See Sidney I. v. Focused Retail Prop. I, LLC, 274 F.R.D. 212, 215 (N.D. Ill. 
2011) (explaining that “older cases applying [the pre-Rule 502(b)] factors remain 
relevant to the Rule 502(b) inquiry”); Jeanes-Kemp, LLC v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 
No. 1:09CV723, 2010 WL 3522028, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 1, 2010) (citing Alldread 
v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434-35 (5th Cir. 1993) as binding authority not-
withstanding the fact that it predates the Rule by more than a decade); Luna Gaming-
San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, No. 06-cv-2804, 2010 WL 275083, at *5 
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010).  Though beyond the scope of this brief introduction to Rule 
502(b), the resort to pre-rule case law arguably reflects a judicial reluctance to aban-
don the common law standards that were intentionally abrogated by Congress.  More 
troubling still, the most extreme case, Jeanes-Kemp, resorts to pre-rule case law as if 
Congress somehow incorporated or ratified the existing inadvertent waiver jurispru-
dence.  See Jeanes-Kemp, LLC, 2010 WL 3522028, at *1.  Not only does this ap-
proach potentially represent a usurpation of legislative authority under the guise of 
interpretation, it seriously undermines the “uniformity” goal sought by Congress 
insofar as different jurisdictions appear determined to hew to their divergent pre-rule 
standards.  See supra  Part III.A.    
 112. See, e.g., Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 
2009 WL 4949959, at *10 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009) (resorting to Webster’s New 
World Dictionary to define “inadvertent”). 
 113. See supra note 110-02 and accompanying text.  Another interesting quirk in 
the early case law may prove potentially formative with further development.  Several 
early cases have struggled with the question of when in the litigation process Rule 
502(b) – and Rule 502 more generally – can apply.  Some courts suggest that Rule 
502 is limited to a discovery context.  See, e.g., Alpert v. Riley, 267 F.R.D. 202, 209-
10 (S.D. Tex. 2010).  Other courts take a slightly broader view and have considered 
Rule 502 claims addressing disclosures preceding or following formal discovery.  See, 
e.g., Multiquip, Inc. v. Water Mgmt. Sys. LLC, No. CV 08-403-S-EJL-REB, 2009 
WL 4261214, at *4 n.4 (D. Idaho Nov. 23, 2009). 
 114. No. CV06-607-HU, 2008 WL 5122828, at *2-3 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2008). 
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set that was actually produced.115  Put slightly differently, the Relion court 
refused to afford a disclosing party any relief where that party – however 
diligent – permits or creates an opportunity for privileged materials to slip 
through the party’s review protocol.116  Shortly thereafter, the district court in 
Coburn Group, LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC, expressly rejected Relion’s 
stringent new standard.117  Instead, it concluded that parties need only take 
“reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” – but not all reasonable steps – as 
indicated in the Advisory Committee notes.118   
This simple but significant split signals two important things for the 
broader rule.  First, where Relion and Coburn appear to diverge is their will-
ingness to focus on the “purpose” behind the rule.  Whereas Relion paid no 
attention to the legislative history and Advisory Committee notes in its analy-
sis,119 Coburn specifically noted its desire to conform to the Advisory Com-
mittee’s goal of avoiding unnecessary discovery burdens.120  Thus, just as 
courts look to different sources to interpret Rule 502, they also may not agree 
that the purpose behind the rule should be an animating force dictating its 
application.121  Second, the preventative requirements of Rule 502(b) speak 
directly to the likely development of Rule 502(d) in a given jurisdiction.  
Admittedly, the case law data is simply too limited at present to see if this 
hypothesis is fully borne out.  Still, at least logically speaking, a strict inter-
pretation of Rule 502(b), which is always applied after an inadvertent disclo-
sure, would suggest a broad, prophylactic view of Rule 502(d) orders, which 
are entered before the possibility of an inadvertent disclosure.  Conversely, 
Rule 502(d) orders are arguably less important, at least with respect to inad-
vertent disclosures, in jurisdictions that adhere to Coburn’s more lenient 
standard.  After all, a district court would be rightly reluctant to exercise its 
broad discretion under Rule 502(d) when it already possesses the judicial 
tools to easily fix any problem an inadvertent disclosure might create.122   
  
 115. Id. at *3.   
 116. Id. 
 117. 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 118. Id. (rejecting Relion based on the explanatory notes to the rule). 
 119. Relion, 2008 WL 5122828, at *2. 
 120. Coburn, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1040. 
 121. As illustrated infra, this reality cuts both ways.  On the one hand, a plain, 
non-referential reading of Rule 502(b) may increase discovery costs.  At the same 
time, a similar approach to Rule 502(d) arguably permits unfettered discovery with 
little or no privilege review.  See infra Part V.A.   
 122. For still another take that unites these two Rule 502(b)-Rule 502(d) connec-
tions, see Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 262 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 2009).  In Amobi, the 
district court not only expressed its view that Rule 502 primarily only protects large 
scale electronic productions, but it went even further to suggest that Rule 502(b)’s 
primary purpose was simply to protect against subject matter waiver in the run of 
cases.  Id. at 52 n.1, 53.  This approach takes an extraordinarily narrow view of the 
rule but also sticks closely to the stated congressional purposes.  FED. R. EVID. 502 
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In short, Rule 502(b) – the primary focus of Congress, the Advisory 
Committee, and the early case law – has proven far more controversial than 
the unanimous legislative history of the rule appears to have anticipated.  
Those controversies, while too new and undeveloped to offer reliable instruc-
tion, illustrate a number of potential roadblocks, judicial preferences, and 
unanticipated issues that may guide the future development of other aspects 
of the rule. 
2.  Rule 502(a) 
Limiting the application of subject matter waivers was another major 
stimulus driving this statutory reform effort.  Rule 502(a) represents some-
thing of a compromise position.  Though it covers a wide range of disclo-
sures, the rule’s limits on subject matter waiver were quite clearly an attempt 
to encourage cooperation with government investigations.123  At the same 
time, it also serves as a reminder that the rule stopped short of adopting selec-
tive waiver.124  In practice, Rule 502(a) has proven less controversial than 
Rule 502(b), but it too has introduced an array of potential problems that 
likely anticipate the future development of Rule 502(d).  Specifically, early 
cases in this area have continued the heavy reliance on legislative history 
observed in Rule 502(b) cases, have demonstrated a holistic view of the 
broader rule, and have even broached the difficult question of where discov-
ery protections end and evidentiary problems begin. 
Early applications of Rule 502(a) have focused simply on equity.  And, 
in many respects, Rule 502(a) might fairly be seen as a straightforward codi-
fication of the sword-and-shield prohibition discussed in Part II supra.  The 
fairly recent decision in Coleman v. Sterling represents a prime example of 
this phenomenon.125  In Coleman, the defendants voluntarily disclosed a re-
dacted version of investigative reports in discovery.126  The question pre-
sented was whether the defendants were required, under Rule 502(a), to pro-
duce unredacted versions.127  Much like the Datel court in the Rule 502(b) 
context, the Coleman court simply walked through the three prongs of the 
new rule.  First, the court concluded that the defendants had voluntarily pro-
  
advisory committee notes.  Accordingly, it militates in favor of a supporting broad 
approach to Rule 502(d) in electronic discovery cases to better facilitate those pur-
poses.  See, e.g., Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 54.  In short, the case law should eventually 
reveal an inverse relationship between the breadth of construction afforded Rule 
502(b) and the breadth of construction afforded Rule 502(d).  
 123. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a) (expressly referencing disclosures made “to a fed-
eral office or agency”). 
 124. Rule 502 Letter to Congress, supra note 52, at 6. 
 125. No. 09-CV-1594, 2011 WL 2005227 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2011). 
 126. Id. at *1. 
 127. Id. at *1-2. 
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol77/iss4/3
File: CorrellPaginated.docx Created on: 6/24/13 9:21 PM Last Printed: 10/23/13 8:39 PM 
2012] THE TROUBLING AMBITION OF FRE 502(d) 1055 
 
duced the redacted reports.128  Second, the court found that the defendants 
had conceded in briefing that the redacted material directly related to the un-
redacted material.129  Finally, the court turned to the question of whether the 
redacted material ought, in fairness, be disclosed to provide context to the 
unredacted material.130  The court found that disclosure was required on the 
grounds that “[d]enying Plaintiffs access to the redacted sections would ad-
vantage Defendants by allowing them to use attorney client privilege and 
work-product protection at once as a sword and shield.”131  In short, Coleman 
illustrates that early application has focused, by and large, on equity.132   
However, the early interpretations of Rule 502(a) have not been without 
their noteworthy quirks.  First, district courts taking the first stab at applying 
Rule 502(a) have afforded unusual and disproportionate weight to legislative 
history and Advisory Committee notes.133  At the same time, many of these 
same courts have also invoked pre-rule case law to shore up their reason-
ing.134  The courts have used the available legislative materials to harmonize 
the new rule with existing common law limits on subject matter waiver.  
Combined with the emphasis on the sword-and-shield prohibition, this trend 
strongly suggests that courts do not see Rule 502(a) as a new device.  In fact, 
  
 128. Id. at *3. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  Interestingly, in support of this reasoning, the court cited to United States 
v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) and Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 
974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992).  Id.  Both cases substantially predate the rule 
and address the sword-and-shield prohibition.  See Chevron Corp., 974 F.2d at 1162; 
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292. This choice of authority underscores the early judicial 
perception that Rule 502(a) is functionally just a codification of that common law 
rule. 
 132. This trend is particularly apparent in cases denying Rule 502(a) protection.  
See generally Johnson Outdoors, Inc. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., No. 05-C-0522, 2011 
WL 196825, at *2-3 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2011); Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL 4949959, at *12-14 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009).  
But see Wi-LAN, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. C-10-80254, 2011 WL 500072, at *3-4 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2011) (withholding subject matter waiver protection where the rule 
would otherwise apply but that disclosures predated the filing of the suit), vacated sub 
nom. Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
 133. See Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. N.H. Ins. Co., No. 2:04-cv-03027-STA-cgc, 
2011 WL 1930703, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. May 19, 2011), supplemented, No. 2:04-CV-
03027-STA-cgc, 2011 WL 2462215 (W.D. Tenn. June 17, 2011); Coleman, 2011 WL 
2005227, at *2; Silverstein, 2009 WL 4949959, at *9-10. 
 134. Smith & Nephew, 2011 WL 1930703, at *2 (citing In re United Mine Work-
ers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 312 (D.D.C. 1994)); Coleman, 
2011 WL 2005227, at *3 (citing Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292; Chevron Corp., 974 
F.2d at 1162). 
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other than the occasional reference to the rejection of selective waiver,135 
these courts do not even seem to see Rule 502(a) as a particularly remarkable 
innovation.  This view of the rule could have far reaching implications with 
respect to other provisions.  If courts eventually come to see the larger rule as 
doing nothing more than selecting among and codifying previously compet-
ing doctrines, they may be unwilling to fully embrace the significant authority 
conferred by Rule 502(d) discussed infra.136  While this restrained approach 
to the rule may not be a bad thing, it seriously undercuts the utility of Rule 
502 as a cost-cutting and standardizing device. 
Further, as noted above, the emphasis in applying Rule 502(a) has been 
equity – not efficiency.137  While Rule 502(a) nominally provides a degree of 
predictability, courts still view the third prong of Rule 502(a) – whether dis-
closed and undisclosed materials “ought in fairness to be considered to-
gether”138 – as a case-specific, normative analysis.139  To that end, the early 
approach employed by most courts has been to conduct in camera reviews of 
the disclosed and undisclosed documents to assess this requirement.140  This 
methodology fatally undermines the twin goals of cost reduction and uni-
formity that underpin the rule.  The strong emphasis on the third prong’s 
case-specific analysis means a party will never know the consequences of a 
given disclosure until it is too late.  Thus, a party will be required to engage in 
the same intensive review and analysis before making disclosures.  Conse-
quently, Rule 502(d) becomes all the more important in the context of volun-
tary partial disclosures.  Assuming, as argued infra, courts have broad discre-
tion to authorize virtually any disclosure, Rule 502(d) can restore the lost 
predictability of Rule 502(a) by providing declaratory-judgment-style ad-
vance guidance.   
The early case law has also demonstrated two additional surprises that, 
while it is too soon to see if they will continue, could have an enormous im-
pact on the entire rule.  The first issue addresses how courts view the inter-
play between the various provisions of the rule.  In Silverstein v. Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, the district court addressed a party’s attempt to clawback a 
  
 135. Silverstein, 2009 WL 4949959, at *12 (reiterating the suggestion in the ex-
planatory notes that Rule 502(a) reserves subject matter waiver to, inter alia, “prevent 
a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the adver-
sary” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee notes)). 
 136. See infra Part IV.B. 
 137. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text. 
 138. FED. R. EVID. 502(a)(3). 
 139. See, e.g., Richardson v. Sexual Assault/Spouse Abuse Res. Ctr., Inc., 764 F. 
Supp. 2d 736, 744 (D. Md. 2011). 
 140. See e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. N.H. Ins. Co., No. 2:04-cv-03027-STA-
cgc, 2011 WL 1930703, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. May 19, 2011), supplemented, No. 2:04-
CV-03027-STA-cgc, 2011 WL 2462215 (W.D. Tenn. June 17, 2011); Richardson, 
764 F. Supp. 2d at 744. 
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number of documents that the party deemed privileged after production.141  
The party sought to restore its claim of privilege pursuant to Rule 502(b) or, 
in the alternative, limit the scope of waiver using Rule 502(a).142  In conclud-
ing that Rule 502(b) did not apply but Rule 502(a) did, the court made several 
notable decisions.  First, the court determined that, quite logically, Rule 
502(b) and Rule 502(a) must be assessed in that sequence – first assessing 
inadvertence then assessing intentionality.143  Second, the court went to great 
lengths to distinguish the concept of “inadvertent disclosure” under Rule 
502(b) from “intentional waiver” under Rule 502(a).144  Again, though an 
obvious conclusion, it reflects a budding belief that each of these provisions 
can be seen as a discrete unit subject to their own case law and interpretive 
guidance.  Therefore, the various provisions of the rule, or at least the opera-
tive provisions, may be seen as truly discrete rules notwithstanding their 
nominal combination under a single rule. 
In another important development, a recent district court opinion ad-
dressed the question of when Rule 502(a) should be considered.  In Smith & 
Nephew, Inc. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., the court considered a motion 
to compel disclosure under Rule 502(a).145  Though the offensive use of the 
rule by the moving party is itself an interesting and novel tactic, that devel-
opment is not the most interesting aspect of the Smith & Nephew decision.  
Rather, the striking part of the decision was the court’s refusal to decide.  
Rather than immediately compel production, the court determined that, 
[I]t is not appropriate [during discovery] to determine whether ei-
ther attorney-client privilege or work-product protection has been 
waived.  The question of waiver is more appropriately determined 
if and when either party attempts to present arguably privileged in-
formation as substantive evidence, either upon motion for sum-
mary judgment or at trial, because it is at this point in the litigation 
that the District Court would determine whether or not certain ma-
terials “ought in fairness to be considered together” to avoid a “se-
lective and misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage 
of the adversary.”146 
Instead, the court held that only Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(1) applied and the materials should be presented to the magistrate judge 
  
 141. No. 07-cv-02471, 2009 WL 4949959, at *1-4 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2009). 
 142. Id. at *9-10. 
 143. Id. at *12. 
 144. Id. 
 145. No. 2:04-cv-03027-STA-cgc, 2011 WL 1930703, at *1-2 (W.D. Tenn. May 
19, 2011), supplemented, No. 2:04-CV-03027-STA-cgc, 2011 WL 2462215 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 17, 2011). 
 146. Id. at *2 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502 & explanatory note to subdvision (a)). 
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to determine whether they were discoverable.147  This emphasis on the split 
between discovery and evidence has not been addressed, or even acknowl-
edged, by many courts.  Still, it is a critical distinction.  Whereas the former 
controls access to information, the latter controls use.  As will be discussed 
infra in Part IV, this split has major implications for the scope and potential 
uses of Rule 502(d). 
Again, as with Rule 502(b), early applications of Rule 502(a) provide 
enormous insight into how courts view the new rule.  The consistent devel-
opments between Rule 502(a) and Rule 502(b) suggest that Rule 502(d) will 
likely follow a similar path.  At the same time, the divergences noted above 
also suggest that courts are willing, in the right circumstances, to treat the 
various provisions of the rule as discrete authorizations and move in different 
directions with this newfound authority.   
B.  The Vaulting Ambition of Rule 502(d) 
Rule 502(d) has already overleaped and extended the fairly considerable 
authority conferred by the narrow reading envisioned by Congress.148  The 
early cases applying Rule 502(d) diverge into three distinct categories: (1) 
courts linking the issuance of Rule 502(d) orders to some sort of satisfaction 
of the requirements of Rule 502(a) or (b); (2) courts relying upon Rule 502(d) 
orders to support a decision to compel disclosure over an assertion of privi-
lege; and (3) courts approaching Rule 502(d) as a source of unfettered author-
ity to protect the privilege to whatever extent is necessary to advance the im-
mediate needs of pending litigation.  
1.  The “Enabling” Approach 
Rule 502(a) and Rule 502(b) clearly represent the substantive meat of 
Congress’s effort to reform and reconcile privilege jurisprudence.  In fact, the 
rule can be seen as falling into two parts: two substantive provisions followed 
by five procedural and technical provisions.  The one subparagraph that pre-
cedes Rule 502(d) and the three subparagraphs that follow address a variety 
of procedural details including the consequences of state court disclosures, 
the effects of party agreements, the effect of the rule on state proceedings, 
and a few key definitions.149  It is unsurprising, then, that a great many of the 
early courts charged with applying Rule 502(d) have treated it as little more 
than an enabling provision that simply gives force to the protections afforded 
by Rule 502(a) and Rule 502(b), or alternatively, that allows courts to proac-
tively resolve certain Rule 502(a) and Rule 502(b) issues in advance.   
  
 147. Id. 
 148. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
 149. See FED. R. EVID. 502(c)-(g).   
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Decided less than a year after the rule went into effect, Peterson v. Ber-
nardi represents a quintessential demonstration of this very narrow approach 
to Rule 502(d).150  In Peterson, the plaintiff brought a “Motion to Compel the 
Return of Inadvertently Produced Documents Pursuant to [Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure] 26(b)(5)(B).”151  The plaintiff’s motion concerned 156 al-
legedly privileged documents that were inadvertently disclosed by the plain-
tiff.152  The court first found, unremarkably, that the majority of the claimed 
documents were not privileged and that even if they had been privileged, the 
plaintiff failed to meet the strictures of Rule 502(b).153  The court then turned 
to a special, nine-page subset of the claimed documents.154  The court ex-
pressly concluded that this short run of pages satisfied Rule 502(b) and, ac-
cordingly, their inadvertent disclosure did not constitute a waiver.155  But the 
legally operable language of the order that followed made no reference to 
Rule 502(b).  Instead, it read: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to FRE 502(d) any 
privilege or discovery protection attached to documents 
POO86988-6996 is not waived by the inadvertent disclosure in this 
court.156 
In so holding, the court implicitly concluded that Rule 502(b) does not, 
in itself, afford a presiding judge with any authority to enter a controlling 
order.  Instead, the court treated Rule 502(d) as the source of authority neces-
sary to put the two major substantive provisions of Rule 502 in to effect. 
Similarly, a number of courts following the logic of Peterson have lim-
ited Rule 502(d) to providing for clawback agreements and similar proactive 
devices for addressing inadvertent disclosures in advance of a problem actu-
ally arising.  In Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, for example, the court con-
sidered a motion for entry of such a clawback provision.157  In deciding 
whether and in what form to grant the motion, the court hewed closely to 
Rule 502(b).158  The court focused its analysis largely on whether a Rule 
502(d) order would help prevent disputes regarding (1) the proper under-
standing of the term “inadvertent” (the principle concern of Rule 
502(b)(1));159 (2) the propriety of a party’s efforts to avoid inadvertent disclo-
  
 150. Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424 (D. N.J. 2009). 
 151. Id. at 426. 
 152. Id. at 427 n.1. 
 153. Id. at 427-30. 
 154. Id. at 430. 
 155. Id. at 430-31. 
 156. Id. at 431 (emphasis added). 
 157. No. 08-2638-CM-DWJ, 2010 WL 2949582 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010). 
 158. See id. at *3-8. 
 159. Id. at *7. 
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sure (the principle concern of Rule 502(b)(2));160 and (3) the cost-savings 
issues that motivated the adoption of the rule in the first place.161  This analy-
sis directly reflected the Rajala court’s stated understanding of the power 
conferred by Rule 502(d) to “fashion an order, upon a party’s motion or its 
own motion, to limit the effect of waiver when a party inadvertently discloses 
attorney-client privileged information or work product materials.”162  In short, 
even in choosing to proactively address inadvertent disclosure issues, the 
court still viewed Rule 502(d) as little more than a vehicle for enforcing the 
express substantive protections contained in the first two provisions of the 
rule.163   
Ultimately, this approach to Rule 502(d) does not comport with the text 
enacted by Congress.  First, as will be discussed in greater detail infra, Rule 
502(d) contains no limiting language.  It does not reference Rule 502(a) or 
(b).  It does not reference inadvertent disclosure or subject matter waiver.  
Rather, it is only restricted in one way: a court may only regulate the conse-
quences of disclosure “connected with the litigation pending before the 
court.”164  Further, the language of Rule 502(a) and Rule 502(b) does not 
suggest an external enforcement mechanism is even necessary.  Rule 502(a) 
focuses on subject matter waiver – not the very different Rule 502(d) question 
of “non-waiver.”  Assessing the scope of a given waiver has always fallen 
within a trial court’s broad discretion, and Rule 502(a), while arguably nar-
rowing that discretion, does not demand any sort of procedural change for 
exercising that discretion.  Rule 502(b) also focuses on a different problem 
than Rule 502(d) – ex post correction of a mistake that has already occurred.  
Rule 502(d), on the other hand, is concerned with whether a future disclosure 
will work a waiver.  This fact is underscored in the Advisory Committee 
notes to Rule 502(d).  The note explaining Rule 502(d) associates it with pro-
  
 160. Id. at *6. 
 161. Id. at *7; see supra Part III.A. 
 162. Rajala, 2010 WL 2949582, at *4.  In keeping with this view, the Rajala court 
later refused to enter an order exceeding these bounds when it excluded certain addi-
tional requested provisions, such as a clawback protection for documents that a party 
failed to properly designate as confidential.  Id. at *8. 
 163. For another, albeit somewhat unusual, decision reaching similar conclusions, 
see Alcon Mfg., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1642-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL 5070465 
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008).  Alcon, decided only two months after the rule went into 
effect, was one of the first cases to address the application of Rule 502(d).  See id. 
The Alcon court afforded a pre-Rule 502 order with Rule 502(d) status because the 
disclosing party had made a “good-faith representation that [its] disclosure was inad-
vertent” and had promptly acted to recover the documents.  Id. at *6.  Though the 
court only cited to Rule 502(b) in passing, its analysis very much mirrors that of the 
other cases treating Rule 502(d) as a mechanism of Rule 502(a) and Rule 502(b).  Id. 
at *4. 
 164. FED. R. EVID. 502(d). 
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active confidentiality orders – not the retroactive considerations of Rule 
502(b).165   
Consequently, the early cases reducing Rule 502(d) to a simple tool of 
Rules 502(a) and (b) are likely in error.  A court need not reference Rule 
502(d) to enforce Rules 502(a) or (b), and conversely, a court need not limit 
its authority to enter non-waiver orders based on those provisions.   
2.  The “Compulsion” Approach 
A second group of courts has taken a more liberal view of Rule 502(d) 
that stops short of allowing wholesale voluntary disclosures but still treats the 
new authority conferred by Rule 502(d) as a freestanding tool of judicial 
economy.  This small but growing number of courts have issued Rule 502(d) 
orders to protect a party’s claim of privilege while requiring that party to dis-
close privileged material in discovery.  Borne of the cost-saving imperative 
underlying Rules 502(a) and (b), this approach increasingly looks to become 
a major corollary to the clawback approach discussed supra.166  Of some con-
cern, these courts have effectively negated parties’ ability to assert claims of 
privilege – the most significant and frequent objection to compelled discovery 
– and, in some cases, have completely abrogated the Rule 502(b) requirement 
that a party take reasonable steps to prevent inadvertent disclosures. 
Radian Asset Assurance v. College of Christian Brothers of New Mexico 
represents a prime example of this emerging trend.167  In Radian, the defen-
dant objected to a request for production that demanded it surrender 52 
backup tapes and 135 hard drives.168  By the time of the hearing on the plain-
tiff’s motion to compel, the defendant had only successfully reviewed 6 of the 
hard drives, and it had only restored 26.5 of the backup tapes.169  At the hear-
ing, the court proposed issuing a Rule 502(d) order to alleviate any privilege 
concerns associated with compelling the production of all of the requested 
materials.170  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that allowing whole-
  
 165. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee notes to subdivision (d). 
 166. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.   
 167. No. CIV 09-0885 JB/DJS, 2010 WL 4928866 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010). 
 168. Id. at *1. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at *2 (“At the October 4, 2010 hearing, the Court proposed ordering the 
College to produce the CSF ESI, subject to an order under rule 502(d) preserving the 
College’s claims of privilege and of protections for the materials.”).  The court indi-
cates in its opinion that the defendants were amenable to disclosing the requested 
materials under a Rule 502(d) order once the court suggested that solution.  Id.  The 
opinion does not provide sufficient information to assess whether the defendant actu-
ally approved of this compromise position or, instead, it read the writing on the wall 
and seized upon the opportunity to cut its losses.  See id.  Regardless, a court’s ability 
to enter sua sponte Rule 502(d) orders to overcome privilege objections in this way 
presents its own freestanding concerns.   
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sale disclosure without any review – for privilege or anything else – violated 
various civil procedure rules or otherwise unfairly shifted costs.171  It then 
compelled disclosure but issued an order that “pursuant to [R]ule 502(d) of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . the disclosure by the College to Radian 
Asset of the [backup tapes and hard drives] is and shall be made without 
waiver of any attorney-client privilege or work-product protection[.]”172  In 
so doing, the court absolved the defendant of its responsibility to protect its 
privilege claims – thereby saving potentially enormous document review 
expenses – while still providing the plaintiff with the material it believed was 
necessary to prove its case. 
And Radian is not an aberration.  A handful of other cases have reached 
similar conclusions.  In Wade v. Gaither, for instance, the court simply 
granted a motion to compel and dropped a reference to Rule 502(d) in a foot-
note at the end of its order.173  Unlike the Radian defendant, however, the 
Wade defendant did not acquiesce to a Rule 502(d) order.174  Instead, the 
court forced discovery over the defendant’s persistent objection.175  In PIC 
Group, Inc. v. LandCoast Insulation, Inc., the court used Rule 502(d) to tem-
per discovery sanctions imposed on a defendant.176  Specifically, the court 
ordered the defendant to turn over an expert’s hard drive after the expert ran a 
program that deleted certain key discovery materials.177  While the court was 
determined to give the plaintiffs access to the withheld and purportedly de-
leted materials, it was unwilling to impose a waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege with respect to the defendant’s communications with the expert or 
the expert’s electronic documents unrelated to the pending litigation.178  Ac-
cordingly, the court used the Rule 502(d) order to both support and tailor its 
compelled disclosure sanction.179   
Finally, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York, 
the author of the landmark Zubulake v. UBS Warburg decision,180 has joined 
  
 171. Id. at *8-9.  This cost-shifting issue is addressed in greater detail infra in Part 
V.A as one of the significant problems starting to become apparent in the case law.  
As it relates to the present discussion, the cost-shifting problem represents one of the 
few checks that might dissuade a court from simply gutting privilege protections by 
compelling privileged disclosures as a matter of course.   
 172. Id. at *9. 
 173. No. 2:08-cv-641-WFD-DN, 2010 WL 624249, at *3, *3 n.15 (D. Utah Feb. 
20, 2010). 
 174. See id. at *1-3. 
 175. Id. at *3. 
 176. No. 1:09–CV–662–KS–MTP, 2011 WL 2669144, at *4 (S.D. Miss. July 7, 
2011). 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (functionally creating modern “hold 
notice” requirements). 
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the growing list of jurists subscribing to the use of Rule 502(d) as a way to 
compel disclosure without stripping a party of its privilege claims.  In Pen-
sions Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Amer-
ica Securities, LLC, the defendants sought sanctions against the plaintiffs for 
permitting the “destruction of relevant evidence, submit[ting] false and mis-
leading declarations, and … [giving] false deposition testimony.”181  When 
the plaintiffs responded to the sanctions motion, they served the defendants 
with “heavily redacted copies” of the declarations supporting their defense.182  
Responding to the defendant’s demand for unredacted copies, Judge 
Scheindlin ordered the plaintiffs to remove most of their redactions but or-
dered that the disclosure of the redacted material would not work as a waiver 
per Rule 502(d).183  In so doing, Judge Scheindlin took the compelled disclo-
sure track of Rule 502(d) jurisprudence in something of a new direction.  She 
used the rule to support a compelled disclosure related to a collateral pro-
ceeding rather than the core merits dispute.184  Thus, her decision to grant the 
defendant’s request for access went beyond the realm of discovery.   
Ultimately, the “compulsion” jurisprudence developing around Rule 
502(d) appears to be growing.  These early decisions use Rule 502(d) to pro-
tect advertent but involuntary disclosures.  Though seemingly equitable in 
cases like Radian, where the subject party was satisfied with Rule 502(d) 
protection, this trend presents an array of troubling questions in other circum-
stances that, as discussed at length infra in Part V, strike to the very heart of 
the attorney-client privilege and threaten its continued reliability.  Moreover, 
though arguably permitted by the plain language of the rule, nothing in the 
rule’s text, interpretive notes, or legislative history suggests Congress in-
tended for courts to be able to force parties to share their privileged docu-
ments with adversaries in cases.  This “compulsion” approach to Rule 502(d) 
represents, perhaps, the most troubling line of cases to emerge thus far.   
3.  The “Separate Authority” Approach 
The most striking development in the early case law, however, has not 
been the anticipated use of Rule 502(d) orders to support Rule 502(a) and 
Rule 502(b) or the district courts’ realization that Rule 502(d) can smooth the 
way for compelling disclosure.  Instead, what stands out as the most interest-
ing, and perhaps most far-reaching, development is the increasing number of 
courts that view Rule 502(d) as a source of broad authority to authorize any 
sort of privileged disclosure – even voluntary sharing between parties – that 
advances pending litigation.  Specifically, two undeveloped but increasing 
lines of authority suggest that Rule 502(d) may be able to protect any disclo-
  
 181. No. 05 Civ. 9016(SAS), 2009 WL 2921302, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at *1. 
 184. See generally id. 
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sure authorized by a district court.  The first line of authority still maintains 
the pretense of linking Rule 502(d) to Rule 502(b), but in truth, advocates a 
freestanding protection for voluntary disclosures.  The second line of cases 
goes one step further and would authorize courts to ratify virtually any volun-
tary disclosure between parties.   
Before turning to these two schools of thought, it is important to note 
one important precursor concept that permeates all of the “separate authority” 
case law.  The provisions of Rule 502 can be broken out in a variety of ways.  
One approach used by courts that have adopted the “enabling” view treats 
Rules 502(a) and (b) as the only substantive provisions of the rule and regards 
the remainder of the rule as providing the mechanics for carrying out those 
substantive provisions.  The courts in the “separate authority” cases appear to 
take a different view.  Rather than treating Rule 502(d) as a mechanical de-
vice, they treat it, along with Rule 502(e), as a source of proactive relief while 
viewing Rule 502(a) and (b) as sources of reactive relief.  The decision in 
Community Bank v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. provides an impor-
tant example of this mode of Rule 502 analysis.185  In that case, the court 
started by rejecting the parties ex ante Rule 502(e) agreement.186  While it 
acknowledged that Rule 502(e) was a source of proactive relief, it found the 
agreement too technically flawed to permit enforcement.187  The court then 
moved to Rule 502(b) as the source of appropriate ex post authority after not-
ing the parties had not sought a Rule 502(d) order.188  Thus, Community Bank 
squarely bifurcates Rules 502(a) and (b) from Rules 502(d) and (e).  As the 
cases infra bear out, this distinction between proactive relief under Rules 
502(d) and (e) versus reactive relief under Rules 502(a) and (b) provides one 
of the primary justifications for applying a broad reading to the plain lan-
guage of Rule 502(d).  
The first of the “separate authority” approaches to emerge looks and 
feels very much like the “enabling” interpretation discussed supra.189  In 
these cases, courts typically invoke Rule 502(d) to preserve privilege where 
one party allows another party to take a “quick peek” at privileged materials 
either to test the accuracy of a privilege log or otherwise confirm the disclos-
ing party has acted in good faith.190  Flomo v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, 
Inc. provides a particularly bold application of this “quick peek” view.191  In 
ordering significant disclosures from the defendant, the Flomo court paused 
  
 185. No. 1:08-cv-01443-WTL-JMS, 2010 WL 1435368 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 8, 2010). 
 186. Id. at *3. 
 187. Id. at *3-4. 
 188. Id. at *4. 
 189. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 190. See, e.g., D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., No. 06-687 (JDB/JMF), 2010 
WL 3324964, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2010) (noting the court’s use of a protective 
order promulgated under Rule 502(d) and (e) “to permit plaintiff to test the validity of 
the privilege log” without working a waiver of any claimed privilege).  
 191. No. 1:06-cv-00627-DHF-JMS, 2009 WL 1456736 (S.D. Ind. May 20, 2009). 
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to note that, “[i]f [d]efendants are concerned about the inadvertent disclosure 
of privileged information by making available documents that they have not 
themselves reviewed, the Court directs Defendants to [Fed. R. Evid.] 502(d) 
and (e), which may provide a vehicle to minimize the risk.”192  The Flomo 
court’s superficial adherence to the “inadvertent disclosure” justification of 
Rule 502(b) belies its apparent understanding of the rule.  After all, the court 
suggested that the defendant seek an order protecting privilege over docu-
ments the defendant planned to intentionally surrender – either voluntarily or 
under compulsion of court order.193  Thus, nothing about the disclosure in 
Flomo was poised to be “inadvertent.”  Instead, the court was inviting the 
defendant to make voluntary disclosures under the protection of Rule 
502(d).194  Therefore, this approach only imposes the most superficial of lim-
its on the ability of parties to protect their privilege claims while at the same 
time authorizing regular disclosure of protected documents.   
Not all of the courts have been so coy, however.  A small number have 
begun shedding all restriction and treating Rule 502(d) as exactly what its 
language provides – a broad grant of judicial authority confined only by the 
bounds of trial court discretion.  Nowhere is this approach more clearly ar-
ticulated than the increasingly cited decision in Whitaker Chalk Swindle & 
Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp.195  Though Whitaker actually applied 
Rule 502(d) to compel a particular disclosure, the court’s reasoning pushes 
Rule 502(d) past the ordinary “compulsion” approach discussed supra.  The 
non-moving party in Whitaker expressly argued that “Rule 502 is limited to 
inadvertent disclosures.”196  Rejecting this contention, the court explained: 
Although the rule address [sic] the consequences of an inadvertent 
disclosure of privileged information, this is not the extent of the 
rule.  Instead, the plain language of the rule addresses the “disclo-
sure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-
  
 192. Id. at *8 n.5. 
 193. Id.  This point bears additional emphasis.  Whether by mistake or some new 
understanding of the law, many of the courts applying Rule 502 appear to conflate 
“inadvertent” with “involuntary.”  In a case like Flomo where a party has agreed to 
disclose documents, there is nothing “inadvertent” about the disclosure because the 
documents are intentionally provided to the opposing party.  Id. at *3.  Similarly, 
where a court orders disclosure, the disclosing party is still intentionally transmitting 
documents it believes to be privileged.  Hence, Rule 502(b) and its approach to inad-
vertent disclosures should, when viewed properly, be inapposite to voluntary and 
involuntary-but-compelled disclosures.   
 194. See id. at *8 n.5. 
 195. No. 4:08-CV-684-Y, 2009 WL 464989 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009). 
 196. Id. at *4. 
35
Correll: Correll: Troubling Ambition of Federal Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
File: CorrellPaginated.docx Created on:  6/24/13 9:21 PM Last Printed: 10/23/13 8:39 PM 
1066 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
client privilege or work-product protection” in various “circum-
stances.”197  
Accordingly, the court broadly ordered that disclosure in the then-
pending suit would not work as a waiver in any other litigation.198  The most 
important facet of Whitaker is its unequivocal resort to the plain language of 
the rule in the face of an argument pointing to the clear purpose of the rule.  
In short, the court’s reading as excerpted above would place no limits on the 
sorts of disclosures that could be protected by a Rule 502(d) order.   
Two important decisions, one of which has been implicitly ratified by 
the United States Supreme Court, support Whitaker’s approach.  First, in Ji-
carilla Apache Nation v. United States, the United States Court of Federal 
Claims entered an order compelling the Government to disclose certain 
documents and refusing to stay the litigation pending appeal.199  Based on this 
order, the parties subsequently developed and presented a joint stipulation 
and proposed order pursuant to Rule 502(d).200  The order preserved any 
claim of privilege attached to any document disclosed pursuant to the court’s 
earlier order.201  After the order was entered, the Government disclosed the 
documents and pursued an appeal.202  That appeal ultimately reached the 
United States Supreme Court.203  The point of this procedural narrative is 
simple: the stipulated order developed by the parties and entered by the Court 
of Federal Claims had the effect of preserving privilege in the context of a 
voluntary disclosure.  If it had not, then the Government would have lacked 
standing because the privilege would no longer have existed.  But, instead, as 
the Supreme Court noted in its decision, the “Government’s compliance with 
the production order [did] not affect [the Court’s] review” because the Gov-
ernment only complied after the entry of a “protective order.”204  Therefore, 
while certainly collateral to the main decision, this single footnote strongly 
suggests that the Court was willing to accept that the Rule 502(d) order pro-
tecting a voluntary, rather than inadvertent, disclosure was sufficiently effec-
tive to preserve the privilege pending review after the documents were dis-
closed. 
The second important decision illustrates how Whitaker’s view of Rule 
502(d) is being used even outside of the district courts to authorize wholesale 
voluntary disclosures.  In In re Portland Natural Gas Transmission System, 
  
 197. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502). 
 198. Id. at *5-8. 
 199. 91 Fed. Cl. 489, 496 (Fed. Cl. 2010). 
 200. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 219, 219-21 (Fed. Cl. 
2010). 
 201. Id. at 220. 
 202. In re United States, 590 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. United 
States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (U.S. 2011). 
 203. See Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313. 
 204. Id. at 2320 n.2. 
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the presiding administrative law judge entered a stipulated protective order 
dictating that disclosure of a specific document that a party had claimed was 
privileged would not work a waiver in that litigation or any other matter pur-
suant to Rule 502(d).205  As a consequence, the parties were able to avoid a 
costly dispute about whether the commission should compel disclosure.206  
The commission’s decision demonstrates the logical endpoint of Whitaker’s 
“plain language” approach – complete abrogation of the disclosure rule in the 
discovery context.  This case presents an extreme example: parties were per-
mitted to use Rule 502(d) to agree, some might even say collude, to engage in 
private discovery proceedings shielded from public view.   
The plain language reading of Rule 502(d) advocated explicitly by Whi-
taker and implicitly by the other courts discussed in this section would effec-
tively authorize courts to ratify any disclosure of any information between 
parties in pending litigation.  Taken to its logical end, this approach could 
permit a broad shielding of litigation proceedings and disclosure from the 
public record while also largely obviating the need for privilege review and 
other measures to prevent disclosure of privileged information.  Interestingly, 
this approach encourages courts to advance their own interests – specifically 
their own dockets – and the interests of the parties in front of them without 
regard to the secondary consequences a Rule 502(d) order could create.  
Thus, it appears quite likely that more and more courts will begin moving 
toward this “separate authority” approach and taking a broader view of their 
own discretion to authorize this unfettered-but-private exchange of informa-
tion in an effort to move pending litigation along all the while failing to ac-
count for potential collateral costs. 
V.  POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A PLAIN LANGUAGE ADOPTION OF 
RULE 502(D) 
The three emerging approaches discussed in Part IV make one thing 
clear: Rule 502(d) has the potential to be revolutionary.  And “revolutionary” 
is not a term used lightly.  Unlike so many other so-called “revolutionary” 
developments in the rules and cases governing modern civil procedure and 
evidence, Rule 502(d) may bring about a fundamental Gestalt switch in how 
American litigants (and litigators) view not only discovery, but the role and 
function of the attorney-client privilege, the appropriate reach of judicial 
authority, and the proper understanding of the courts as a public system em-
ployed to resolve private disputes. 
Virtually all of the scholarship addressing Rule 502(d) has focused on 
the validity of the rule as an appropriate exercise of congressional author-
  
 205. 132 F.E.R.C. 63015 (2010), 2010 WL 3738365. 
 206. See id. 
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ity.207  This Part takes the constitutionality of Rule 502(d) as a given and, 
instead, seeks to refocus the discussion on the Rule’s potential consequences.  
To that end, it explores a non-exhaustive list of three major issues presented 
by the rule: (1) whether Rule 502(d) orders reduce costs or merely shift the 
burden and risk of privilege review to the receiving party; (2) whether pro-
phylactic Rule 502(d) orders may ultimately undermine client confidence in 
the attorney-client privilege; and (3) whether Rule 502(d) orders implicate the 
Due Process rights of absent parties. 
A.  The Cost-Shifting Effect of Rule 502(d) 
Before turning to its more far-reaching implications, the first major issue 
presented by Rule 502(d) is whether it actually accomplishes anything.  After 
all, as has been discussed at length, the fundamental goal of the new rule – 
regardless of which interpretive approach a court applies – is to expedite liti-
gation and reduce costs.  But the early case law has raised an important ques-
tion: does a Rule 502(d) order protecting privilege actually reduce costs, or 
does it merely shift the cost of privilege review and the attendant risk of fail-
ing to spot privileged documents to the receiving party?  While the answer to 
this question remains uncertain in light of the varying early applications of 
the rule, this potential problem presents a range of possibilities that could, in 
practice, defeat any gains created by issuing Rule 502(d) orders in a majority 
of cases. 
The most common emerging use of Rule 502(d) orders appears to ad-
here to a consistent pattern.  First, the court enters a Rule 502(d) order finding 
that any “disclosure of privileged information” in the course of discovery will 
not work a waiver.208  The order likely would not make any reference to in-
advertence notwithstanding the fact that most courts already appear to believe 
their orders imply an inadvertence limitation.209  Second, relying upon the 
order, the disclosing party forgoes privilege review or applies a very minimal-
ist privilege review protocol.210  Third, the receiving party evaluates the 
  
 207. See 2 CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
5:35 (2012) (defending Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to enact the rule); 
Roger P. Meyers, An Analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and its Early Applica-
tion, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1441, 1462-68 (2009) (touching upon constitutionality of 
application of federal orders to state courts); Henry S. Noyes, Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 502: Stirring the State Law of Privilege and Professional Responsibility with a 
Federal Stick, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 673 (2009) (focusing on the legislative con-
stitutionality issues of the rule). 
 208. See, e.g., Flomo v. Bridgestone Ams. Holding, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-00627-
DFH-JMS, 2009 WL 1456736, at *8 n.5 (S.D. Ind. May 20, 2009). 
 209. See, e.g., Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., 
No. 4:08-CV-684-Y, 2009 WL 464989, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009). 
 210. The lack of authority on this particular point is a function of the relative 
novelty of prophylactic Rule 502(d) orders.  An exhaustive search reveals no cases 
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documents it receives.  It can no longer assume that it has received non-
privileged material from the opposing party.211  Thus, the receiving party 
does not know whether any of the documents it has received from opposing 
counsel will be subject to a claim of privilege that has been protected by the 
Rule 502(d) order.212  This mundane but problematic sequence of events ap-
pears to be based on the generally consistent trends exhibited by the limited 
Rule 502(d) corpus.   
The first possible consequence of this scenario is that litigants and 
courts will discover that worries about cost shifting are much ado about noth-
ing.  After all, a receiving party winnows down mountains of documents to a 
small selection it views as important to its case.  Once it has done so, quickly 
ascertaining whether that much smaller selection is privileged may not re-
quire much additional effort.  Further, courts could make disclosure of major 
privilege flags, such as the names of in-house and outside counsel, part of the 
discovery process without adding any meaningful cost.  Thus, while the re-
ceiving parties would have some uncertainty, a few minor adjustments could 
restore their confidence in their ability to rely on the produced materials as 
non-privileged evidence.   
Still, this outcome only works if a few requirements are met.  First, re-
ceiving parties will have to develop yet unseen ways of assuring themselves 
that materials they received are not privileged and, therefore, be able to con-
fidently rely on them going forward.  More specifically, receiving parties will 
need to develop verification procedures to determine a document’s status 
without prematurely disclosing their interest in a given document – lest they 
sacrifice a strategic advantage in the name of verification.  Second, this out-
come also falls apart if disclosing parties attempt to broadly assert privilege 
claims over any damaging evidence that comes to light as the litigation pro-
ceeds.  After all, the disclosing party, acting under a Rule 502(d) order, has 
made no implicit or explicit certification that it believes it is producing non-
privileged responsive documents.  Thus, if disclosing parties routinely assert 
privilege citing a Rule 502(d) order well after disclosure, then the risk of evi-
dence being snatched away likely would persist.  That risk would force re-
ceiving parties to carefully conduct privilege reviews of disclosed documents 
to evaluate whether a given piece of evidence will ultimately be barred by a 
privilege claim.    
The second possibility is that Rule 502(d) does shift the costs – resulting 
in a zero net gain.  The mechanics of this outcome are actually quite simple.  
  
yet where a party specifically challenges the deficient review of disclosing party in 
the context of a Rule 502(d) order after the fact. 
 211. See Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, No. 08–2638–CM–DJW, 2010 WL 
2949582, at *3 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010) (noting receiving party’s argument that it 
“would essentially be made to perform [the disclosing party’s] privilege review and 
proceed with depositions and motion practice with the ever-present concern that any 
document could suddenly be taken back by [the disclosing party]”). 
 212. Id. at *3-4. 
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After a court issues an order preserving the privilege, the privileged docu-
ments are subject to exclusion at all phases of the litigation, including in mo-
tions for summary judgment213 and at trial.214  Further, assuming litigants 
continue to behave as they do now, neither of the preconditions discussed 
supra will be satisfied – receiving parties will not be satisfied with their abil-
ity to anticipate claims of privilege absent full-blown privilege reviews and 
disclosing parties will make Rule 502(d) privilege claims at critical points, 
such as during motions for summary judgment, to challenge adverse evi-
dence.  As a consequence, one likely outcome may be that Rule 502(d) orders 
simply force receiving parties to conduct full privilege reviews.  Such a shift 
would, at minimum, move the costs of discovery currently charged to disclos-
ing parties over to receiving parties.  In reality, this practice could actually 
increase discovery costs from their present level by sharing rather than com-
pletely shifting privilege protection costs.  Because, as noted earlier, some 
courts mix Rule 502(b) and Rule 502(d) analyses,215 a court may attempt to 
assess the reasonableness of a disclosing party’s privilege review measures in 
deciding whether to enforce the Rule 502(d) order to exclude evidence.  Con-
sequently, at least in jurisdictions exhibiting any tendency to link Rule 502(d) 
and Rule 502(b), disclosing parties would be well-advised to conduct at least 
some sort of privilege review to justify later Rule 502(d) claims.  Hence, in 
this scenario, the combined efforts of both parties to screen for privilege 
would, at minimum, match and possibly increase discovery costs. 
Still, the third possible outcome is even worse.  Rule 502(d) orders 
could dramatically escalate the costs of discovery.  In all likelihood, Rule 
502(d) orders might lull disclosing parties into relaxing their privilege re-
views.  As a result, damning documents will eventually be disclosed.  Thus, a 
disclosing party will be faced with the very high likelihood that the receiving 
party will work vigorously to admit these particularly adverse privileged 
documents.  Put simply, Rule 502(d) will only reduce the costs of disclosing 
parties if receiving parties accept that they cannot circumvent the protection 
of a Rule 502(d) order – notwithstanding the fact that they may be looking at 
the proverbial smoking gun.  In reality, receiving parties are far more likely to 
seek to strip away such protections under the guise of penalizing the disclos-
ing party for wholesale or unjustifiable failures to stop the disclosure of privi-
leged information.  If courts permit this sort of gamesmanship and allow re-
ceiving parties to work around Rule 502(d) orders, then discovery costs may 
well escalate dramatically.  Disclosing parties would be forced to engage in 
the same costly privilege reviews they do today to ensure the protections of a 
  
 213. See, e.g., Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“[E]vidence submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be 
admissible.” (quoting Alpert v. United States, 481 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2007) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted))). 
 214. See generally Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 (1998) 
(explaining and affirming the exclusion of evidence under the privilege). 
 215. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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Rule 502(d) order will continue to apply.  In short, depending on how courts 
choose to enforce the protections of a Rule 502(d) order, these new “cost-
saving” “protections” could actually double the amount of privilege review 
required. 
As with so many aspects of Rule 502(d), it is too soon to tell how orders 
preserving privilege will play out.  Nonetheless, if past litigation behavior is 
any indicator of future action, only a strong judicial refusal to bend on the 
protections granted by Rule 502(d) orders and an effort to provide clarity to 
receiving parties will actually bring about any meaningful cost-savings.  In 
particular, courts should take three important steps to avoid these problems.  
First, Rule 502(d) disclosures cannot be linked to the abstract “reasonable 
steps” analysis governing Rule 502(b) determinations.216  Either disclosing 
parties must be permitted to safely abandon all privilege review (not that they 
actually will do so) without fear of later consequences, or, alternatively, 
courts must specifically identify in a given order what steps a disclosing party 
must take.  This measure would prevent receiving parties from seeking to 
work around Rule 502(d) orders – the primary risk that would motivate con-
tinued privilege review expenditures by disclosing parties in a Rule 502(d) 
world.  Second, courts should require disclosing parties that want the benefit 
of Rule 502(d) to provide a comprehensive and exclusive list of attorneys, 
employees, and agents.  Such a requirement would give receiving parties the 
ability to make provisional privilege determinations after identifying the 
documents they wish to use as evidence.  Third, receiving parties should be 
afforded an opportunity to invite an in limine-style review in advance of any 
attempt to rely upon documents disclosed under a Rule 502(d) order.  This 
last requirement is key because receiving parties will not be able to confi-
dently make use of any disclosed documents if they have no vehicle for de-
termining whether a Rule 502(d) order will pull the documents out of their 
hands.217  Together, these three guidelines may be able to dramatically reduce 
the persistent risks that threaten the efficacy of Rule 502(d) as a cost-reducing 
tool. 
B.  Attorney-Client Privilege in a Rule 502(d) World 
Unlike the issue of potential cost shifting, the next problem presented by 
Rule 502(d) orders has far broader implications.  As one early commentator 
has explained, Rule 502(d) orders may well become prophylactic devices 
included as a matter of course in court scheduling orders.218  In theory, such 
an approach makes sense.  It would create uniformity between pending mat-
  
 216. FED. R. EVID. 502(b), (d); see supra note 117-21 and accompanying text. 
 217. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d).  This problem obviously exists anytime a system 
does not impose a total waiver based on inadvertent disclosures, but it is particularly 
exacerbated if the disclosing party is relieved of all risk and responsibility. 
 218. See Noyes, supra note 207, at 756-57.  
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ters, provide predictability at the outset of litigation, and functionally elimi-
nate the need for Rule 502(b) analysis by addressing all potential privilege 
disclosures ex ante.  In practice, however, widespread use of Rule 502(d) 
orders to make the disclosure of privileged information routine could produce 
several severe consequences.  The regular disclosure of privileged material – 
through sloppy (or non-existent) privilege reviews or voluntary sharing – may 
ultimately whittle away client confidence in the ability of the privilege to 
protect their secrets.  More practically, it would encourage the disclosure of 
privileged information that, while forbidden from use by such an order, 
would still impart critical knowledge to opposing parties.  Finally, Rule 
502(d) orders, married with the “compulsion” approach discussed earlier, 
could place forced disclosures beyond the critically important reach of mean-
ingful review.  
Should Rule 502(d) orders become commonplace and the expectation 
that counsel protect privileged documents start to fall away, client faith in the 
promise of privilege – the most critical cornerstone supporting the persistence 
of the attorney-client privilege – could give way.  To lawyers and the lawyer-
legislators behind Rule 502, privilege is often viewed only as an important 
shield at critical moments in the litigation process.  Clients, however, are 
likely to see privilege in a very different light.  The privilege does not only 
protect their disclosures years later in the face of discovery requests.  Instead, 
it authorizes, enables, empowers, and otherwise eases the process of sharing 
the truth with counsel.  Thus, while lawyers tend to consider privilege in the 
context of discovery and, to a lesser extent, trial, clients worry about the pro-
tection of their confidences from the outset of the attorney-client relationship.   
That initial need to assess the risk that confidences will escape the 
bounds of the attorney-client relationship is where regular use of Rule 502(d) 
orders may become a problem.  Though counsel obviously cannot voluntarily 
share privileged information without client authorization in most circum-
stances,219 the early case law readily demonstrates that courts and attorneys 
see Rule 502(d) as a way to reduce the amount of effort they put into protect-
ing privileged communications from inadvertent disclosure.220  As that bur-
  
 219. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009) (“A lawyer shall not 
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the rep-
resentation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”). 
 220. See Radian Asset Assurance v. Coll. of the Christian Bros., No. CIV 09-0885 
JB/DJS, 2010 WL 4928866, at *7-9 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010) (authorizing the whole-
sale, unreviewed disclosure of large quantities of electronic documents over objec-
tions by the receiving party); Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, No. 08-2638-CM-
DJW, 2010 WL 2949582, at *2, *7 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010) (accepting a Rule 502(d) 
order offered to help prevent “contentious, costly, and time consuming discovery 
disputes”); Flomo v. Bridgestone Ams. Holding, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-00627-DFH-JMS, 
2009 WL 1456736, at *8, *8 n.5 (S.D. Ind. May 20, 2009) (encouraging the parties to 
seek a Rule 502(d) order after noting that the disclosing party need not conduct a 
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den wanes under Rule 502(d) orders, more and more “inadvertent” disclo-
sures will occur.  In fact, should courts move toward the “separate authority” 
approach and circumvent the “reasonable means” requirement of Rule 502(b), 
“inadvertent” disclosures could become a feature of all large-scale (and most 
small-scale) litigation.   
From the litigator’s perspective, this turn of events may not seem prob-
lematic.  But from the client’s perspective, every inadvertent disclosure – 
whether used by the other side or not – represents a loss of control over sensi-
tive information that began when the client relied upon the privilege in decid-
ing to share confidences with counsel.  As the risk of disclosure increases, the 
potential benefit from engaging in “privileged” communications declines.  
While some communication will always be necessary to press a claim or 
mount a defense, full disclosure, or at least near-full disclosure, will become 
less and less likely or, for that matter, advisable.  In short, if clients cease to 
believe that the privilege will protect their secrets from disclosure – not just 
from the use of those secrets as evidence – then the privilege may well be left 
with nothing (or at least far less) to protect.221   
Similarly, Rule 502(d) also threatens the protective reach of the privi-
lege insofar as early use of these orders incorrectly appears to assume that the 
disclosure of privileged documents can be undone by a simple judicial com-
mand.  Relying on a judicial fiat to excuse these disclosures is problematic for 
a number of reasons.222  Perhaps the most straightforward problem, though, is 
that a court simply cannot “un-ring the bell” after privileged materials have 
been shown to the other side.  Rule 502 is only an evidentiary rule.  While it 
  
comprehensive responsiveness review); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3TUNES, LLC, 
261 F.R.D. 44, 51 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (suggesting a 502(d) order would suffice to 
alleviate privilege review responsibilities).  Notably, even the model ethics rules cre-
ate an exception for involuntary but intentional disclosures pursuant to a court order.  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6).  Thus, compelled disclosures can 
also be seen as an eroding force much to the same extent as protected inadvertent 
disclosures. 
 221. The Supreme Court recently recognized this potential, at least implicitly, in 
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).  Mohawk held that 
compelled disclosures do not constitute immediately appealable collateral orders.  Id. 
at 603, 609.  The Court reasoned that “[o]ne reason for the lack of a discernible chill 
is that, in deciding how freely to speak, clients and counsel are unlikely to focus on 
the remote prospect of an erroneous disclosure order, let alone on the timing of a 
possible appeal.”  Id. at 607.  But the Court dropped a footnote in which it paused to 
caution that “[p]erhaps the situation would be different if district courts were system-
atically underenforcing the privilege, but we have no indication that this is the case.”  
Id. at 607 n.2.  Arguably, the widespread underenforcement envisioned by the Court 
may well become a very real problem under a broader Rule 502(d) regime.   
 222. One particularly interesting problem that falls beyond the scope of this par-
ticular discussion is that Rule 502(d) orders may authorize lawyers to engage in dis-
closures that could violate professional responsibility requirements in some states.  
See Noyes, supra note 207, at 742-53. 
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does dictate how privileged materials can be used, it has no mechanism for 
accounting for the harmful effects of disclosing secret information.  Once a 
receiving party knows the disclosing party’s secrets, it cannot help but adjust 
its strategy around those secrets even if it cannot use the documents that con-
veyed the information.   
At least a handful of courts have begun addressing this issue.  In Jicar-
illa Apache Nation v. United States, a party facing a forced disclosure ob-
jected that it would be harmed by turning over its own privileged materials 
even in light of the court’s offer to issue a protective order.223  Rejecting the 
defendant’s prejudice arguments, the court held: 
While defendant contends that this remedy is inadequate – that the 
court cannot thereby “un-ring the bell” after the documents are 
produced – that simply is untrue.  A procedure similar to that de-
scribed – the preliminary provision of documents and the ordering 
of their return upon a subsequent determination that a privilege lies 
– is specifically sanctioned by recent amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (and this court's rules).224  
Similarly, even before the enactment of Rule 502, earlier courts, such as 
the court in Stratienko v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, 
held that, even if it could not “un-ring that bell . . . the Court can, and will, 
ensure that any evidence used in this matter complies with the Federal Rules 
of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”225 
But these judicial pronouncements miss the point of the disclosing par-
ties’ objections.  Use of privileged documents as evidence only represents 
half the problem.  The other half of the problem is that a receiving party can-
not reasonably be expected to put privileged information out of its mind once 
it has reviewed it.  The best solution devised by a court thus far has been to 
mark Rule 502(d) protected materials as “Attorneys’ Eyes Only.”226  But 
restricting access to attorneys does not address the fact that those attorneys 
will internally retain the information clawed back under a Rule 502(d) or-
der.227  Reliance on the legal fiction that clawing back information “un-rings 
the bell” simply will not suffice.  At a minimum, this risk of improper use of 
  
 223. 91 Fed. Cl. 489, 494 (Fed. Cl. 2010). 
 224. Id. 
 225. No. 1:07-CV-258, 2008 WL 2001990, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. May 7, 2008), aff’d, 
402 Fed. App’x 990 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 226. See D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., 256 F.R.D. 277, 279 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 227. Further, the “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” designation cannot reasonably be af-
fixed to every document.  But if the disclosing party provides documents without 
substantial review, it will not know until after the fact – and possibly after non-
attorneys on the receiving side – that it has disclosed documents that should be so 
designated.  Thus, this solution, as in D’Onofrio, could only conceivably work in the 
context of a compelled disclosure.   
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privileged material threatens to force parties to continue with costly privilege 
reviews.  At worst, it underscores the possibility that clients may lose faith in 
the privilege when also faced with the reliability issues discussed above.  
Finally, Rule 502(d) could well grant district courts unfettered discretion 
to compel disclosures that leave parties without any hope of immediate judi-
cial review, further deteriorating the attorney-client privilege.  Securing inter-
locutory review is almost always an uphill battle.228  Parties seeking to pre-
vent compelled disclosures under the pre-Rule 502 privilege regime had, at 
best, mixed success seeking appellate interdiction to save their claims of 
privilege from a forced disclosure.  In 2009, the Supreme Court closed the 
door on most immediate appeals in the run of attorney-client privilege dis-
covery disputes.  In Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, the Court held that 
adverse attorney-client privilege rulings were not collateral orders subject to 
immediate review.229  But in Mohawk, the district court’s adverse ruling was 
premised upon its belief that the disclosing party had implicitly waived the 
privilege by making a series of inequitable representations.230  Now, under 
Rule 502(d), a district court will no longer need to justify its decision to com-
pel a disclosure.  Instead, it may, as the early cases seem to indicate, take a 
“let’s see what happens and address it later” approach.231  And, in light of 
Mohawk, no review of these orders will be possible outside the context of 
mandamus in most cases.232  Given the extraordinary difficulty attendant to 
securing mandamus relief and Rule 502(d)’s ability to ameliorate the worst 
superficial consequences of compelled disclosure, district courts would ap-
  
 228. See generally Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 607-09 
(2009). 
 229. Id. at 603. 
 230. Id. at 604.   
 231. Prof. Noyes also provides important commentary on this point.  Noyes, supra 
note 207, at 754-56.  As he explains, neither the rule nor the advisory committee notes 
nor the congressional statement of intent give a district court any guidance on how to 
use its newfound discretion.  Id. at 755.  As explained in Part IV supra, that oversight 
in the drafting process has already led to a tripartite split in the early Rule 502(d) 
jurisprudence.  This area is particularly ripe for legislative clarification and express 
limitation.   
 232. Admittedly, Mohawk suggests immediate review may be available pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  130 S. Ct. at 607.  But such review requires both a control-
ling question of law and the ability to materially advance litigation.  Id.  Neither fea-
ture will likely be present after a district court enters a Rule 502(d) order in most 
cases because (1) such orders permit the arguendo assumption that privileged docu-
ments are being disclosed, thus foreclosing the need to address their actual legal status 
and (2) any gains from an appeal are provided in equal measure by an order creating 
an artificial shield governing a compelled disclosure. 
As noted above, Mohawk did suggest the collateral order doctrine could apply to 
permit immediate appeal in the face of systematic underenforcement of the privilege.  
Id. at 607 n.2.  Whether that would apply here, what constitutes “systematic” action, 
and what the Court meant by “underenforcement” all remain to be seen. 
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pear to have virtually unreviewable authority to compel disclosures as they 
see fit. 
The lack of interlocutory review occasioned by these orders presents 
two important problems.  First, it again undermines the ability of clients to 
rely upon the privilege at the time they decide to share confidential informa-
tion with their counsel.  Second, it could destroy the uniformity and predict-
ability Rule 502(d) was supposed to create.  After all, if more discretion is 
afforded to individual trial judges, then rulings could vary more significantly 
from judge to judge and from court to court.  Thus, unlike the previous two 
issues already discussed, the apparently unbounded discretion created as a 
consequence of Rule 502(d) will also undercut the confidence counsel can 
place in the privilege.  In practice, any increase in the ability of district courts 
to compel disclosures – particularly without any possibility of meaningful 
review – means counsel cannot comfortably expect that privilege will serve 
as a trustworthy shield when the time comes.   
Rule 502(d) orders have already helped lubricate the sticking points in a 
number of discovery disputes.  But as 502(d) orders become more prevalent 
and trend toward becoming the norm, they pose serious threats to the entire 
concept of the attorney-client privilege.  This problem can be remedied in one 
of two ways.  Courts could refuse to treat Rule 502(d) orders as prophylactic 
devices and restrict their use to situations in which they are truly necessary to 
advance litigation.  But that approach will only work if courts generally re-
frain from using these orders to compel disclosure.  Thus, all that would re-
main would be the very narrow subset of conceivable cases where a disclos-
ing party wants to share information to move a case along but does not want 
to waive privilege as to the rest of the world.  Consequently, such an ap-
proach would marginalize Rule 502(d) orders and render them extraordinary 
devices that can only reduce costs and expedite litigation on rare occasions.  
Alternatively, Rule 502(d) orders could be subjected to the strictures of 
Rule 502(b) with respect to inadvertent disclosures and regularly accepted for 
interlocutory review with respect to compelled disclosures.  Such an approach 
would encourage counsel to apply “reasonable means” to catch privileged 
documents and would provide both counsel and clients with confidence that 
their privileged documents will not be forcibly taken from them for arbitrary 
reasons – preserving a modicum of faith in the efficacy of the privilege.  
Again, however, this solution is imperfect.  Applying the Rule 502(b) stan-
dards would suggest that a party should just wait and address inadvertent 
disclosures ex post – obviating the need for a Rule 502(d) order.  And author-
izing interlocutory review, while limiting judicial discretion, would add an-
other round of costs to the discovery process.   
In sum, there are no easy answers.  The broader the reach of Rule 502(d) 
becomes, the more efficient discovery may become but the less reliable the 
privilege becomes.  The appropriate degree of tradeoff between these two 
competing values remains to be seen as the case law develops.  Regardless, 
Rule 502(d) and the privilege are on a collision course that may fundamen-
tally alter the way lawyers and clients interact and share information. 
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C.  Absent Parties, Due Process, and Rule 502(d) 
Though this Article has generally skirted the underlying issues of legis-
lative constitutionality that have haunted Rule 502 since its inception, one key 
constitutional issue deserves some discussion.  Rule 502(d) affords district 
courts a very unusual power – the ability to alter the rights of the rest of the 
world.  If a party makes a disclosure pursuant to a Rule 502(d) order, it does 
not work a waiver “in any other federal or state proceeding.”233  Thus, a non-
party that could previously use a disclosure to force the disclosing party to 
provide the same information in later (or pending) litigation now lacks that 
ability by virtue of a proceeding to which it is not a party.  At least one 
scholar, Professor Henry Noyes, has argued that any order circumscribing the 
rights of an absent party in this way could present a due process violation.234  
While Professor Noyes probably overstates the problem, his point is well 
taken: properly accommodating the due process rights of absent parties will 
seriously undermine the efficacy of Rule 502(d) as an expediting device.235   
In what is perhaps the most comprehensive article to address Rule 502, 
Professor Noyes argues that,  
Entry of a Rule 502(d) order raises a significant question whether it 
violates the Due Process rights of persons and entities who are not 
parties to the federal court litigation because the rule purports to 
make an order of a federal court binding on all persons and entities 
in all . . . proceedings, whether or not they were parties to the liti-
gation and regardless of whether the nonparties are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the issuing court.236   
His argument is not without merit.  After all, Rule 502(d) breaks from 
the traditional limitation that an order is only binding on the parties to the 
litigation in which it is issued.237  Additionally, as Professor Noyes also 
points out, Rule 502(d) purports to allow one federal district court to control 
the waiver determinations of other federal and state courts.238  This defensive 
non-mutual collateral estoppel by virtue of an order in a non-precedential 
court certainly suggests something unusual and possibly unconstitutional. 
Nonetheless, these problems likely do not give rise to an actual due 
process problem notwithstanding the unusual nature of the authority con-
ferred by Rule 502(d).  First, the universe of potential non-parties that could 
  
 233. FED. R. EVID. 502(d). 
 234. Noyes, supra note 207, at 736-42. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. at 736. 
 237. Id. at 736-37 (“[N]o court can make a decree which will bind any one but a 
party,” (quoting Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, 
J.))). 
 238. Id. at 740-41. 
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be inhibited by a Rule 502(d) order falls into two major categories: (1) cur-
rent adverse parties and (2) potential adverse parties.  The due process issues 
applicable to the former category are easily dispensed.  The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure expressly authorize the intervention of interested parties in 
any proceeding that directly affects their particular interests.239  Thus, a non-
party with a matter pending in another court would have a present interest 
that would likely create standing to intervene.  This solution should resolve 
the great majority of due process issues presented by Rule 502(d) orders.   
The other group – non-parties that are not currently adverse to the dis-
closing party – presents similar issues that are both more difficult to resolve 
and less troubling.  The procedure discussed above regarding third-party in-
tervention cannot apply.  After all, a non-party with no present claim would 
have no standing to intervene.240  That fact is only exacerbated by the fact 
that any intervention – by either group – must be premised on wholesale 
speculation that the protected documents are somehow relevant to an inde-
pendent (and possibly unrelated) claim.241  But courts make decisions that 
bind future non-party litigants all the time.  Protective orders foreclose access 
to a wide array of materials – sometimes even court documents.  Judgments 
permanently dispose of assets that, as a result, are  no longer available to sat-
isfy other claims.  And, perhaps most importantly, permanent injunctions 
mandate conduct that may subsequently produce adverse consequences for an 
absent non-party that does not face any present harms to justify (or, for that 
matter, spur) an intervention.  Put differently, a Rule 502(d) order only affects 
the “rights” of absent parties until it does not.  A future party could certainly 
appear before a district court and ask it to revise or rescind a Rule 502(d) 
order upon good cause shown.242   
  
 239. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).  Though the phrase “subject of the action” is some-
what ambiguous, it may well apply to afford a party an absolute right to intervene so 
long as the same material is the subject of pending litigation in another court.  See id.  
That said, a party would very likely be able to seek, at minimum, leave to intervene 
by permission.  FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).  If a court denied an interested party access 
after it affirmatively sought to defend its “right” to information, this situation would 
present a more interesting, and more difficult, due process question. 
 240. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (limiting both intervention by right and permissive 
intervention to parties with a present “interest,” “claim,” or “defense” that will be 
affected by a particular judicial ruling). 
 241. See id. 
 242. Arguably, the mechanism for such a motion would be Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(5).  Under that rule, a final judgment, order, or proceeding may be 
revised or rescinded when it ceases to be equitable.  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5).  Argua-
bly, a Rule 502(d) order is sufficiently final to warrant Rule 60(b)(5) relief given that 
it operates like a permanent injunction binding absent parties and other courts.  11 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
CIVIL § 2863 (2d ed. 1990 & 2005 Supp.) (citing United States v. Swift & Co., 286 
U.S. 106, 114 (1932) for the proposition that a court retains power “to modify an 
injunction in adaptation to changed conditions, though it was entered by consent . . . . 
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Second, with respect to courts, the appearance of outside interference in 
this case is really little more than just that – the appearance of interference.  
All Rule 502(d) orders do is allow courts to make case-specific, unique ex-
ceptions to the disclosure rule.  Under general principles of comity, it would 
be bad form in the ordinary course of litigation for another court to revisit a 
district court’s determination that particular conduct did not work a waiver.  
Rule 502(d) orders simply give that same comity principle the force of law in 
a very unique subset of situations.  Thus, Rule 502(d), at worst, encourages a 
parallel “race to judgment” to get access to a document before a Rule 502(d) 
order temporarily closes the door.243 
Finally, even on a philosophical level, as Professor Noyes acknowl-
edges, it is unclear what cognizable interest is lost as a consequence of a Rule 
502(d) order eliminating a single privilege waiver.244  At best, litigants have 
some sort of cognizable property right in discovery.245  But that right is lim-
ited to the discovery of non-privileged information.  Consequently, it be-
comes a very difficult question whether material subject to a Rule 502(d) 
order is “non-privileged information.”  In one sense, it has always been privi-
leged – thus, no right attaches.  In another sense, such material is non-
privileged following disclosure but for the Rule 502(d) order.  Again, at the 
risk of splitting the hair too finely, the answer to this conundrum can likely be 
found in the legislative history of the rule.  Congress soundly rejected any 
attempt to introduce an evidentiary rule creating “selective waiver.”246  In-
stead, they adopted a rule that, by its terms, imposes a finding of non-waiver.   
While the difference between these two categories is little more than a 
legal fiction, it may well control this key aspect of the due process problem.  
Quite simply, the disclosed material has been privileged since its creation and 
that privilege has never been interrupted.  Thus, an absent party never had a 
right to the material as non-privileged evidence.  More specifically, to use 
Professor Noyes’s point with respect to California law, a Rule 502(d) order 
  
Power to modify the decree was reserved by its very terms, and so from the beginning 
went hand in hand with its restraints”).  Moreover, the rule, by its terms, does not 
limit relief to parties to the original judgment. See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 60(b).  Conse-
quently, a non-party bound by an order entered under Rule 502(d) would likely have 
standing to bring a motion seeking relief from judgment notwithstanding their ab-
sence from earlier proceedings and the unique nature of Rule 502(d) orders.  
 243. Again, it bears noting that even with a Rule 502(d) order in place, a non-
party only loses one ground for claiming waiver.  Rule 502(d) orders do not preserve 
the privilege against any challenge other than the particular disclosure in pending 
litigation that they are issued to address.  FED. R. EVID. 502 addendum to advisory 
committee notes to subdivision (d).  Consequently, even this “race to judgment” ar-
ticulation probably overstates the potential problem. 
 244. See Noyes, supra note 207, at 739-42 (discussing the due process implica-
tions of Rule 502(d)).   
 245. See id.   
 246. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.   
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does not compete with state law.247  First, though Professor Noyes points to a 
potential conflict with California’s evidence code, Rule 502(d) does not im-
plicate California Evidence Code section 952 and its concern for disclosures 
at the inception of a confidential communication because Rule 502(d) orders 
only address existing privileged material.248  Second, with respect to the Cali-
fornia’s waiver rules addressed by Professor Noyes, California Evidence 
Code section 912(c) provides that “[a] disclosure that is itself privileged is not 
a waiver of any privilege.”249  Rule 502(d) orders expressly create a “privi-
leged disclosure” through the district court’s imposition of a finding of non-
waiver.  This result is not unlike any other time a court finds that a disclosure 
did not work a waiver because an exception to the disclosure rule applies.   
Still, even if Rule 502(d) does not actually give rise to a due process is-
sue, the rights of absent parties certainly complicate matters and threaten the 
efficacy of the rule.  For instance, in cases involving large corporations and 
other frequent targets of litigation, any attempt to issue a Rule 502(d) order 
could implicate the rights of dozens – if not hundreds – of potential inter-
veners.  In the cases that most need Rule 502(d) orders to reduce discovery 
costs, attempts to issue such an order could provoke innumerable objections 
that would have to be briefed, argued, and resolved one-by-one.  That process 
would, in itself, add to litigation costs and drag out already long-running mat-
ters.  Additionally, this issue injects an element of uncertainty as to the en-
forceability of Rule 502(d) orders.  Though perhaps a remote contingency, a 
disclosing party cannot be certain that a given Rule 502(d) order will with-
stand constitutional scrutiny until the rule is challenged.  And, in a much 
more mundane way, the ability of non-parties to later approach the court to 
revisit a given order similarly detracts from the predictability of Rule 502(d) 
orders and their effect on a privilege that otherwise is supposed to persist ad 
infinitum.   
Thus, while not dispositive, the due process issues inherent to far-
reaching Rule 502(d) orders present yet another significant issue limiting the 
efficacy of the rule and raising troubling questions about the appropriate 
scope of judicial authority in the realm of discovery disputes.  And, unlike the 
other problems already discussed, these issues do not lend themselves to read-
ily apparent solutions.  The additional litigation costs created by interveners 
are unavoidable.  And the predictability problems attendant to the novelty of 
the rule and the need to revisit orders may be insurmountable in the short-
term.  While Rule 502(d) remains an important new tool, these problems de-
tract from the rule’s utility and may prohibit its use in some of the cases that 
stand to gain the most from protected disclosure.   
  
 247. Noyes, supra note 207, at 740-41.   
 248. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d); Noyes, supra note 207, at 740-41.   
 249. CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Rule 502 very well may spell the end for inadvertent waiver.  And it 
may finally knockout the much-dreaded subject matter waiver bugaboo.  But 
early application and the myriad problems starting to emerge with respect to 
the rule’s most effective tool – Rule 502(d) orders – suggests that any impact 
on the spiraling costs of litigation will be muted at best.  Nonetheless, that 
may not be a bad thing.  In some sense, the tide of reform addressed at the 
cost of discovery seems to have forgotten about the value of the privilege.  
Much of the cost of discovery can be attributed to the desire of clients and 
lawyers to protect their right to freely converse.  A prophylactic approach to 
Rule 502(d) threatens that fundamental right provided by the American legal 
system.  Thus, as Rule 502(d) continues to evolve and encourage the free 
flow of information in litigation, its expansion should be tempered by need to 
protect the attorney-client privilege.  Because, at the end of the day, the cost 
of undermining this critical cornerstone that supports the American approach 
to litigation quite likely far outweighs the purported value conferred or saved 
through quick-fix disclosure orders in one-off cases. 
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